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VOLUME I



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SOME ASPECTS OF CANADA*S IMMIGRATION POLICY

Report prepared for the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism.

Norma E. Walmsley
April, 1966

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
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
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


CHAPTER I - INTRODUCTION

Terms of Reference

The general terms of reference of this particular Royal Commission led naturally to an examination of Canadian immigration policy and its implications by the Research Branch. In view of the specific topic of the Commission, such a study for its purpose would mean addressing oneself to the question of just what Canadian policy is and why, seemingly, it resulted in a situation where most immigrants have either been Englishspeaking or have associated themselves with the English-speaking group.

What is the nature of policy, how is it formulated and administered? Because, at the time of Confederation, Section 95 of the Constitution designated immigration as a matter of concurrent jurisdiction for federal and provincial governments, it goes without saying that answers to these questions are not clear-cut. There are many other questions equally in need of solution. Have these policies been instrumental in furthering or in hindering national unity? Do they reflect the bilingual nature of Canada? What factors influence policy? Does the result represent the wishes of the majority in a democratic society? A study of the problem may provide some answers of interest to the Commission in its greater task. What are the facts with regard to the so-called English-French balance?



In 1867 the fledgling nation had an estimated population of approximately 2 million English, 1 million French and about 250,000 other national origins, including Eskimo and Indians who were here before either the French of English arrived. The ratio of English to French was approximately two to one.

Much has been said and written about Confederation being an gequal partnershipg between the two so-called "founding peoples". This has given rise to the controversial "two-nation" concept. which it is not within our purview to prove or disprove, confirm or deny. However, even if this alleged concept of an 'equal partnership were the basis of Confederation, did this mean that the ratio of French-speaking to English-speaking was irrevocably fixed? Obviously, an attempt to rigidly maintain such a policy would be ludicrous, since the demographic factors of birth and mortality rates, immigration and emigration are ones over which no democratic state would ever wish to exercise a final or rigid control even if it were possible to do so. Nevertheless, given a population, the majority of which was English-speaking and the minority French-speaking -- and, incidentally, a people who had created for themselves a bilingual Parliament -- should this binational beginning necessarily give rise to a distinctive type of national policy vis a vis immigration generally or, indeed, any specific matters pertaining to the changing nature of that population?


^{1.} Figures for 1871, the first Dominion census, include 2,110,502 British, 1,082,940 French and 292,318 others.



Was the spirit of Confederation not carried out by making so important a matter as immigration one of equal jurisdiction for federal and provincial governments? This is assuming, of course, that Quebec (the French part of the new nation) would govern according to its own best interests. A further assumption which could be made was that the federal government (including, as it did, representatives of both French and English) would govern in the best interest of the nation as a whole, with favour to no one part.

However, allegations have been made from time to time since Confederation by French Canadians to the effect that Canada's immigration policy has been detrimental to the French-Canadian people. They claim that there has been a determined intent to benefit the English-speaking part of the nation and argue that the policy has been one of undue encouragement for for immigrants who would assimilate with the Anglo-Saxon element, with little concern being given to policies which would solicit French-speaking immigrants or those easily integrated with the French group. The result of this alleged over-emphasis on English-speaking immigrants (say the French-speaking Canadians) caused an imbalance in the ratio of French to English-speaking and has aggravated the problem, they claim, by placing the French in an increasingly inferior position numerically.


Accordingly, the purpose of this study is to determine, as far as is possible, whether or not there is any foundation in fact to such charges.



The following, therefore, is not a critique of immigration policy per se -- since that would be beyond the scope of our terms of reference. Rather, it is an enquiry into exactly what Canadian policy has been and is (at both the federal and the provincial levels) and, where possible, an analysis of the factors which have determined that policy. If certain factors have influenced it or are presently working in such a manner as to militate toward change in the so-called balance between English and French-speaking Canadians, is this a matter for legitimate concern? Should Canada's immigration policy be an instrument to maintain 'ethnic balance'? Would this hinder harmonious relations between the two groups and, if so, what should be done to remove any such possible source of friction so that they might work together to bridge any gap of misunderstanding, or, in current terms, work towards a better partnership bilingually and biculturally?

We propose, therefore, to determine the nature of immigration policies, both federal and provincial and to ascertain, if possible, whether their formulation, administration, and results are such as to warrant any recommendations from this Commission.


It is necessary at this point to state that the terms of reference of this particular study did not allow time or personnel to examine the demographic factors essential to a complete population survey. (It is the writer's understanding that this is being done by other studies, specifically designed



to cover all such aspects.) Accordingly, there will be no attempt here to provide any demographic presentation, much less a complete analysis of the statistics relating to immigration flow and population generally. As this is a separate field, it is left to the specialists in demography. Their findings presumably are available in other aspects of the work of the Research Branch.

Due to research limitations, then, this study can do no more than provide a brief look at what government policy was and is with respect to immigration into Canada.

Naturally, the effects of an immigration policy on a countr can vary from the salutary to the devastating. This is what theoretically (and practically) makes immigration a controversia subject in any bi-national or multi-national country. The Frence Canadians have "traditionally" been concerned about the ethnic ratio, as witness what has been termed "la revanche des berceau philosophy. Extremist voices in Quebechave decried immigration policy as a trick of les anglais to keep the numbers of the French Canadians proportionately small. While this is being argued on one side, others cry that the French Canadians have too much control of policy in that when pressure is exerted by them on the Cabinet and Government of the day, the immigration tap is turned off. Or again, another familiar charge is that the influence of the French Canadian Roman Catholics on policy is sufficiently strong to "close the door on the European Protestar while the Roman Catholics come pouring in".




virtue, it is difficult to discern. What is Canadian government policy?

Problem

Given the lack of a clear understanding about immigration policy generally and the misunderstanding on the subject which exists between English-speaking and French-speaking Canadians in particular, it is necessary to examine the nature of immigration policy in Canada today and the factors influencing its formulation (both past and present).

Because, constitutionally, this is a matter of concurrent jurisdiction, how much influence have the various provincial governments had on federal policy? Do they all agree on what is best for Canada, or do they each go their separate ways?

In view of their differing histories, to say nothing of their divergent economic and social developments, some provinces have been much more active in the field of immigration than have others. We are concerned, in this study, with the degree of their activity and with their attitudes, which might explain official participation or reluctance to take part. The objective, then, was to ascertain the facts regarding immigration policy in Canada — both federal and provincial.



The Method

- (a) <u>Consultation</u>, by means of personal interviews to obtain informed opinion from federal and provincial government officials responsible for immigration policy, as well as discussions with leading political figures and representatives of labour, agriculture, business, etc. to the extent possible.
- (b) The employment of <u>usual research methods</u> to examine relevant government documents and pertinent secondary sources, to assemble data on immigration policy as well as on the relationship of French Canadians to the whole problem. This should have included a thorough and complete attitudinal study of the points of view of French-speaking and English-speaking Canadians with the consequent effects on immigrant numbers involved, but in view of limited time and staff this was not possible. Nor was there opportunity to examine the whole matter of the European offices of the Canadian Immigration Department and the complexities of other external factors working to encourage or discourage the flow of immigrants to Canada. This, the writer feels, is a serious omission.

Because immigration is a matter of concurrent jurisdiction, and because no previous study exists outlining provincial policy, it was decided that first-hand information should be obtained directly from the provincial governments concerned. Where possible, the Premiers were consulted by means of personal




interviews and/or correspondence¹ as were other provincial departmental officials and politicians. The specific results of these findings are discussed in the section on *provincial policy*.

However, most of Canada®s immigration policy has been formulated and implemented by the federal government; therefore considerable time and effort was expended in ascertaining the views of officials of the federal government. A series of interviews was held with officials of the Department of Citizenship and Immigration, from the Deputy Minister down through all the key officers, (except those of the Overseas Service, since this would have necessitated a trip abroad). Similarly, interviews with leading Members of Parliament, including the former Prime Minister, present and former Cabinet Ministers (particularly Ministers of the Immigration Department), Opposition leaders and other M.P.®s, both English-speaking and French-speaking, constituted another source of information.

The views of other representative groups were also sought through personal interview, telephone or correspondence. The attitudes toward immigration of business, agriculture, labour, education and religious organizations as well as various other non-governmental agencies were all considered.

^{1.} See Appendix A for copy of list of questions posed to each provincial government.



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A French-Canadian colleague assumed responsibility for interviewing officials of the Quebec government and all such persons necessary to determine, as accurately as possible, the action taken by the Quebec government to date and attitudes, in general, with regard to the French-Canadian point of view on immigration.


A great deal of time and effort was exerted in checking the official policy files of the Immigration Branch, Ottawa, as will be indicated by the section on federal policy discussed later. The innumerable files read produced relevant general information, but only a few proved significant in terms of the particular problem under consideration.

extensive. With only one person, the writer, engaged in this study and because of time limitation, an exhaustive and thorough survey of all relevant files was not possible, and it is recognized that a risk exists in impressions gained. However, the data accumulated afforded the researcher an lunderstanding of the policy files which, together with the information gained from discussion with officials concerned, was sufficient for tentative conclusions to be as valid as possible, short of access to material that is available only to those who are privy to Cabinet meetings.²

place!

^{1.} See Report by Andrée Lajoie-Robichaud "Politiques et attitudes à l'égard de l'immigration depuis la Confédération".


Much strong argument could be made at this point as to the desirability for a revision of the Canadian government policy of secrecy in this respect, for the purposes of academic research, but this is probably not the appropriate



Obviously, because of the politically sensitive character of this subject of immigration, the really vital decisions on policy are taken in Cabinet. Without documents or authoritative knowledge of the discussions which take place in these meetings, one has to depend upon incomplete departmental files which perforce give rise to the highly dangerous practice of supposition and conjecture. There is no doubt that certain incomplete reflections can be drawn from the files and the practices of the Department, but knowledge of the arguments giving rise to these decisions (and by whom advanced) would be far more revealing.

In addition to the regular departmental files, the official record of legislative proceedings by the elected representatives of the country provides information about the country's policy. In this respect, while it was not possible (due to lack of time and assistance) to check all federal and legislative reports for the whole period concerned, a detailed study of the Government of Canada Debates from 1945 to present was undertaken to determine the general reaction to officially pronounced government policy (or lack of same)...This is discussed in detail later in this report.

Data were also obtained by means of the usual sources, i.e., government reports, books and journals, newspaper editorials and comments, radio and television coverage, public speeches,



ment including some of the briefs submitted to the Bilingualism and Birulturalism Commission), and finally any available information on attitudes of the public as reported by opinion polls and other similar agencies. The information gathered from these combined sources has been considered carefully and synthesized in the pages that follow, but it is emphasized that great gaps exist in the data accumulated. There is no doubt whatsoever in this writer's mind that immigration policy warrants a much more thorough study. It should be obvious that in a country of immigrants (such as this nation is in the truest sense) no other single policy of government could possibly be more significant.

Canada today (although a glance at the historical section will show this has not always been the case) is one of the few countries where the subject of immigration is important enough to warrant a government department of its own, despite innumerable changes of name and bursts of reorganization. That is, the entire efforts of a particular branch of government are organized for the sole purpose of bringing individuals from other lands to tecome prospective citizens, swearing allegiance to a country which, incidentally, is still searching for its own identity where everyone (unless he be Indian or Eskimo) is himself either an immigrant or the descendant of one from an earlier era.




Interwoven in the chapters of Canadian immigration history are the tragedies of emigration -- It is estimated that more than two million native-born Canadians have emigrated to the U.S. since Confederation. This number does not include the many newcomers from other lands who used Canada as a "corridor" into the land of the Stars and Stripes. How many of these were French-speaking is impossible to determine, but while the number was not extensive, neither was it negligible; one need only travel through the New England area of United States to find sufficient evidence of the fact that the "out-flow" of Canadians was not confined to English-speaking and/or "other ethnic" groups. What efforts were made to woo them back to Canada? We shall consider this question later on in this study.

Why does Canada spend time and great amounts of money attracting strangers to her lands when, as some argue, she refuses to invest the necessary resources which might provide the economic and social conditions to keep her own sons and daughters at home? These are questions beyond the scope of this study, but never far below the surface in any consideration of immigration policy.

Canada has never had a 'long-range' immigration policy.

When attempting to define 'long-range', one concludes that it depends on the 'absorptive' capacity, which is, itself, difficult to define. If you arrive at a figure, say 200,000 annually, it



then becomes necessary to decide or define what kind, quality or type. For, undefined, ten years of 200,000 annually could mean an immigration of 2 million Chinese labourers (to take an exaggerated example) -- would that be a wise policy, given the present economic, political and social structure of our country?

Should immigrants be admitted on the basis of skill only?

If so, has any country the right to go into another sovereign land and actively encourage, in fact, actually urge its skilled men and women to emigrate to Canada, especially in countries where there may indeed be a shortage for that country's own needs? For this very reason, certain countries have antiemigration laws and other restrictive measures. (Further reference will be made later to such 'external' factors and their influence upon Canada's immigration policy.)

Philosophical questions underlying a nation's immigration policy should be answered, but what happens if there is no real consideration of them by those who 'plan' the policy?

In a country where both federal and provincial governments have jurisdiction, how valid is one province's charge that the federal government policy has been detrimental to its particular needs and aspirations if that province has itself made little or no effort to attract immigrants, not even the particular kind of immigrant it professes to desire?



Should a country such as Canada, whose economic development depends, to a great extent, on the influx of large numbers of newcomers, be discriminating in its selection? Is it incumbent upon the federal government to maintain any special ethnic composition of that population?

In attempting to determine the facts surrounding all these aspects of our immigration policy, perhaps some of the questions will be answered; at least the study might provide certain conclusions - which may or may not suggest themselves for use by the Commission.




Canadian immigration is the product of a strange combination of historical accident, individual initiative and government action or, in many instances, inaction. This study is a modest incursion into the government's immigration policy, and some of its effects, as it pertains to the ethnic composition of our land.

From its rude beginning in 1583 in the oldest British colony of Newfoundland and from the primitive stockades of later but more persistent explorers, this country has progressed, through the early French and then British settlements on the mainland proper, to Confederation and, finally, to the partly-industrialized modern nation of today.

This transition has been due to the spirit of adventure, great perseverance (or determined stubborness) and a considerance degree of foresight on the part of a relatively few individuals. Even today, Canada can claim a total population of less than 20 million scattered over an area of 3,851,809 square miles.

In contrast to the rapid development of our southern neighbor — or other areas of the New World, for that matter — the race to fill the empty spaces of Canada with hard-working settlers and to build a new nation out of an unspoiled yet potentially wealthy wilderness was, from the very beginning, run at a cautious, haphazard and very uncertain pace.

^{1.} We refer here to occupation and beginnings of settlement of Canadian territory, not discovery.



16.

Given this relatively uninhabited but vast geographic area, the obvious answer was immigration. What was the policy? We cannot, in this study, go into the details of the settlement which, because of political boundaries and in defiance of geography and all economic logic, was to take place on an east-west basis. The scope of our enquiry is limited to Canadian government policy (federal and provincial) and puts the main emphasis on the period after 1867 when, technically speaking, Confederation of the existing colonies brought a federal *Canada* into existence.

Even commencing at this point it is possible to include only abbreviated statements regarding official policy, because any extensive treatment would lengthen this report to a text-book.

However, one should sketch the main points prior to 1867, emphasizing first (provided we exclude the indigenous Indian and Eskimo) the <u>dual</u> foundation in terms of ethnic composition of the population, namely, the French and the English.

Canadians of French origin today are virtually all descendants of the approximate 10,000 settlers who entered over the 150 years prior to the British conquest of 1763. (By that date,

A really definitive account of Canadian Immigration is yet to be written, although Professor David C. Corbett's excellent book, Canada's Immigration Policy (Univ. of Toronto Press, 1957), is by far the most useful critique to date. Further facts on the subject of this early period may be obtained from comprehensive histories of Canada, but a very short precis is given in an official article, "Developments in Canadian Immigration" in the Canada Year Book 1957-58.



the original group had increased to 65,000, with only a slight influx of new immigrants from France). The rate of natural increase of the French was quite astounding when one includes also the other descendants of early French stock who migrated to parts of the U.S.A., particularly the New England States, and elsewhere.

The reasons why there have been so few immigrants to 'New France' from the 'homeland' on the continent are rather complicated. In modern times only a relatively small handful of individuals have been willing to leave France and come to Canada. While one might have found this fact plausible, given the social and political circumstances of the times, still this does not easily explain the lack of French immigrants during the eraprior to the 19th century and especially before 1763 when the country was ruled by France.

Historians claim that, in fact, emigration to Canada from the "homeland" had virtually ceased as early as 1673 and that "in 1674 Colbert advised the Intendant not to count may more on assistance from the King of France. "1

The same writer argues that later,..."During the 18th century one realizes that the French-speaking fur traders were now Canadians rather than French, inter-marriage with the Indians made the 'coureur-de-bois' indifferent to Europe particularly as

Gibbon, John Murray - Canadian Mosaic - The Making of a Northern Nation, (McLelland & Stewart, Toronto, 1938), p. 28.



his encestral France had been 'step-fatherly'. As merchants and as employers, the British provided him with a better living, and under British rule he did not have to work so many days for his Seigneur without pay, while he was allowed liberty of religion" (and language).

There is no doubt that, after the Revolution in France, the devout French Canadians were alienated by the irreligious actions of the new regime with its new cult of 'Reason' and found closer affinity with the English because of the religious tolerance of the British system. As was clearly discernible during the American Revolution, they gave their loyalty to the British rather than join forces with the revolutionary movement against the British Crown.

Much has been said by many writers of the 'traditional' objection of the Frenchman to leave Europe for new homelands while the so-called 'adventure-seeking' Englishman has pioneered new developments in practically every spot on the globe. It is probably impossible to tell how much truth there is in either of these points of view, and no attempt will be made here to do so; one fact is substantiated, and that is the negligible amount of immigration from France to Canada -- either before 1763 or after as indicated by the statistics in other sections of this report

L. Ibid, p. 29



In the light of this, the fact that the French Canadians have maintained their homogeneity is all the more amazing.

That their numbers have grown as large as they have done has been due to their determination to maintain their own culture and way of life in the face of great odds.

While it can be stated that in Canada today the Frenchspeaking population (5,123,151 or 28.09% of the total population)¹,
comprise a relatively homogeneous group, this is not the case
for the English-speaking portion. This fact is very often overlooked in the context of the so-called 'French - English problem'
so controversially an issue on the current scene.

When one speaks of "the English-Canadian" he should define his terms. If he says "English-speaking" then he really means most everyone except the <u>unilingual person</u> of French mother tongue (and the relatively few unilingual persons of mother tongue other than English or French). Certainly the term "English-speaking person" could include all categories of ethnicity (approximately 50) found in population statistics. Even if he means Canadians or immigrants of <u>British Isles origin</u> this could include Asian, African, West Indian, etc. since innumerable entrants from the British Isles over the years have come from a variety of racial and ethnic backgrounds and, while they speak English and often have been born in England, their backgrounds are definitely distinguishable.

^{1.} Census of Canada statistics, 1961.




A great deal of needless confusion is caused by the practice of lumping together as 'English' all those whose mother tongue is not French. In the British North America of 1763, the 'English' did mean, more or less, that element of the population who had come from the British Isles, either directly or by way of Nova Scotia and the Eastern seaboard settlements wherever British colonies could be found.

As for a conscious government policy to bring in *English* persons only, evidence is sparse indeed. There is no doubt that external factors such as the American Revolution caused thousands of "British Loyalists" to emigrate north to those parts of the country which were later to confederate into Canada. These were not necessarily all *English* by any means. They settled in what is now Nova Scotia, New Brunswick, Prince Edward Island, Quebec and Ontario (the latter two then referred to as Lower and Upper Canada).

In addition, several thousand Scottish settlers migrated from their homeland mainly in groups (e.g. approximately 25,000 built homes in Cape Breton in the first quarter of the 19th century). Yet, an official governmental immigration policy as such did not really exist.

One must constantly keep in mind the fact also that it was not simply one government involved but rather a number of them since, prior to 1867, the authorities wielding power included at first the British government but also the colonial regimes



21.

of Nova Scotia, New Brunswick, as well as Upper and Lower Canada (the latter two becoming one for the period between 1841-67).

The Napoleonic Wars and other events in Europe lent impetus to the exodus of large numbers particularly from the British Isles. Of these, some 500,000 came to Canada up to 1840 --66,000 coming in the year 1832 alone! But these resulted from external factors and not from a determined or conscious government policy. Generally speaking, however, the lure of the U.S.A. overshadowed the call of the northern portion of the American continent. Between the years 1834 and 1910 the volume of annual immigration to the United States from Britain was consistently larger than that to the north. Again, this vast influx of immigrants was not due to government action so much as it was to external factors, in particular a disastrous famine in Ireland. For example, it was chiefly Irishmen who comprised the 2,250,000 who sailed from the British Isles between 1846 and 1854. Of these, only 500,000 landed in Canada; the rest decided that their future lay in the U.S.A.

While technically we cannot speak of 'Canadian' government policy before Confederation (not even during the years of 'responsible government' from 1840-1867), external factors did more to influence the question than did any particular policy of either the 'Canadian' colonies or the British government. This is not to say, however, that the settlers were unaware of the need to develop the country.

For the period 1840-1867, see Gates, Paul W, Official Encouragement to Immigration by the Province of Canada; the Canadian Historical Review, Vol XV (Univ. of Toronto Press, 1934), pages 24-38.



Promotion of immigration on the part of the "Canadians" themselves had been advocated for many years, as the realization grew that the United States was developing at a far more rapid rate than they. So much so, in fact, that it was proving most attractive to those settlers north of the border (particularly French-Canadians who emigrated to New England).

The first action taken by the "Province of Canada" after the union in 1840 was in 1854 when an appropriation was made to send an agent of the Bureau of Agriculture to Europe. At this time also, the first pamphlets designed to encourage immigration were prepared and distributed abroad.

In 1856 a 34-page pamphlet was prepared and translated into German, Norwegian and French and sent to those countries. From that date on, such pamphlets were prepared almost annually but the reports of agents at the time, in Quebec and Montreal, indicate that most of the Continental immigrants continued to pass through to the United States.

Several committees during the years 1857 to 1862 were set up to study the causes of emigration and the means of stopping it (with special reference to the French Canadians). In 1859 and 1860, three more select committees were established to study the question. The first two strongly recommended more active immigration policy; the third committee, made up of French Canadians, undertook the study of the possibility of immigrants from France, Belgium and Switzerland.




Nevertheless, such action as was instituted by the Canadians had very little influence on the overall results because of external factors which governed the era. There is no doubt that from 1765-1865 in Great Britain 'emigration' was the subject of everyday conversation in one way or another, but this was because of the economic and social conditions then existing and not because the British Government, as such, had any definite policy. During the century between 1765 and 1865 the British North American colonies received over one and a half million immigrants from the British Isles.

This immense immigration transformed the colonies, won from the French in 1763, into growing nations which by 1865 were on the whole British in tradition and outlook.

This may be seen clearly by the figures given in the first census for the new Confederation when, of the three and one-half million population listed in 1871 only approximately one-third was of French-Canadian origin.

There is nothing surprising about the influx of immigrants to the New World if one considers for a moment the economic conditions existing in Europe, but particularly in the British Isles, where the vast industrial changes brought totally unforeseen problems. These problems were of such dimensions that emigration was the only way out for countless thousands. Perhaps the great exodus from the Scottish Highlands is a good example.

^{1.} Cowan, H. British Emigration to British North America Rev. and enlarged edition, (Univ. of Toronto Press, 1961), p. 228.



Soon after the collapse of the Stuart cause in 1745, with the subsequent break-up of the clan structure, the system of land tenure underwent great change. Bad crops and resultant famine, plus other ills, added to the misery and it is understandable that scores of villages and towns became empty shells while their inhabitants left to search for a new life in the New World. Most went to the United States, but cheaper fares to the Northern half of North America attracted many. After 1763 when Highland regiments in the New World were disbanded and given lands in the areas where they had so recently fought, letters home to relatives also contributed to the emigration fever. Shipping agents and land speculators did not fail to take advantage of this situation. So much false information about the prosperity and possibilities of the New World was passed out that the Government was forced to appoint agents to supply the factual details in an effort to counter this problem. Actually, the government was not anxious to encourage emigration but they did realize the necessity of providing accurate information for those who wished to emigrate. The government was prepared, by February 1832, to distribute "Information published by His Majesty's Commissioners for Emigration respecting the British Colonies in North America."1

^{1.} Ibid., p. 182.




Needless to say, primitive shipping services made the 'crossing' a nightmare, and sea ports like Halifax, Quebec, etc. were soon the unhappy recipients of disease and pestilence as ships disgorged their unfortunate human cargoes. The need for corrective legislation became most imperative and the first of the unpopular Passenger Acts began to find their places in the statute books (although it was a reluctant British Parliament which enacted them, since political and financial powers of the ship owners and others with vested interests were strong indeed).

The Lieutenant-Governors of Lower Canada, New Brunswick and Nova Scotia became interested in similar protective legislation, especially the per capita tax.

This study cannot concern itself with the details of this whole period, except to say that, as would be expected after 1763, England obviously had to follow a line that would maintain the Colonies under her jurisdiction.

It was not at all surprising that the British should develop the territory of British North America in a way which would conform to their mercantile needs. Accordingly, when she brought in settlers it was chiefly for provisioning or defence reasons. One must make the point however, that certainly up to 1815, because of defence needs, the official policy of the British Government was not, for the most part, one of promotion of




emigration to the Americas. On the contrary, at times they viewed the exodus of population with alarm, looking upon it as a potential drain of manpower in the unstable political situation that existed throughout Europe. Only after the Napoleonic era, when defence needs decreased, could they begin to take a different attitude toward the loss of population.

Even when the Government became interested in emigration, it was chiefly to divert the large-scale movements from settling in the United States (because of the suspicion with which that country was regarded after the American Revolution). It was more agreeable to have these people settling in Canada as a bulwark against any further expansion of the new republic to the South. The idea that emigration could be a relief to unemployment and destitution did not at first occur to the British officials.

Positive action was slow to materialize.

"On July 24, 1828, A.C. Buchanan arrived at Quebec as
Resident Superintendent and Agent for Emigrants at a salary of
£300 per annum; the first step ever taken by Government to manage
emigration with care." He was appointed, of course, by the
Colonial Office and this marks the beginning of the immigration
service in Canada.

^{1.} MacDonald, Norman, Canada 1763-1841; Immigration and Settlement (Longmans Green, New York, 1939), p. 21.



Again, space does not permit elaboration of his duties nor of those named to similar posts in the years that followed. In the British Parliament there was continued opposition to any expense involved in assistance of emigration, although various schemes did exist from about 1825 on. Many of those who landed in British North America eventually found their way to the United States, although exact statistics are not available.

While strong, healthy, industrious immigrants were welcomed to the colonies, the destitute and the undesirables were, needless to say, not appreciated. Halifax, Montreal and Quebec suffered greatly in this respect and conditions were frightful. "Emigrant Societies" were formed to help and they officially objected to the situation while petitioning the government for money to care for the sick and destitute. Cholera outbreaks in the arrival ports caused strong concern. In 1832 and the years following, poll taxes - the first government action by Canadian authorities - were gradually imposed in order to raise funds to meet some of the need, but this was a totally inadequate source and considered by some to be unfair to the immigrants. The French-Canadian press at the time made a political issue of the indifference of the Colonial Office to Colonial problems, as indeed they had good reason to do. There is no doubt that the situation was deplorable and in need of government action. It was in no way a policy of systematic colonization but indeed a frightening neglect and was defined by the Montreal Gazette of March 23, 1837, as "a policy of drift characteristic of the Government and the nation."



There was a widespread policy of granting huge tracts of land to responsible 'capitalists' on condition that they, in turn, induce settlers to take up the land for community development. (The Talbot settlement was one example.) These, like the settlements of Loyalists and of disbanded regiments, met with mixed success -- depending upon the initiative, zeal and sense of duty of the individual colonizer. Again, the British government was not following any really definite or consistent policy and the country did not gain as fully as it could or should have done.

The French had made the mistake prior to 1763 of not 'colonizing' the area in the real sense. While Great Britain recognized this and had no desire to lose Canada in a similar manner, she, too, was more than a little shortsighted, and settlement languished owing to the negligence of the officials concerned. Imperial Land Policy, with its inconsistency and its willingness to experiment with ideas -- so long as they meant little or no cost to the public purse -- was not noted for its wisdom. Such benefits as did accrue to Canada's future were more good fortune than good management. Again, one cannot truthfully say that any real policy existed, and certainly not one to 'fill the country with good Anglo-Saxons' to the detriment of the French Canadian. Naturally, any settler willing to give allegiance to the British Crown was welcome; this was not so much because of any fear of the French Canadian but rather, up until



the mid-nineteenth century at least, because of a real fear of the "revolutionary" republic to the South. (Certainly the War of 1812 and unrest of following years proved that such concern had not been unfounded.)

The short-sightedness of the Colonial office seemed matched by that of the local officials in the councils of Upper and Lower Canada and all the other British colonies in North America. Their all-too-frequent habit of ignoring the legitimate grievances of the settlers, coupled with a most inconsistent and inefficient handling of land policy, did much to inhibit any rapid development of the country.

For a quick or .imme diate financial gain, the government turned vast parcels of land over to great land companies (such as the Canada Company) who undertook settlement. Although this resulted in sharp controversies -- not the least of which were on racial and religious grounds -- the land companies, in many cases, provided the funds for sorely-needed public services which the British Government refused to make available. Incidental to the so-called advantages of such a policy was the fact that such companies were adding to the British population -- a result not unwanted from the British government's point of view

Unquestionably, government action could have produced a less wasteful land policy and reduced speculative gain on the part of land company members. Some lauded the land companies, saying the country owed them a debt of gratitude for their role



in its development; many others argued that companies were doing the job for which the Government should be responsible and, in so doing, lining their pockets at public expense. On the whole, the policy produced mixed blessings but, given the absence of a definite Government immigration policy, one can only conclude that the Government was really not terribly concerned. This hardly supports the charge of a "determined concerted effort to fill the country with British immigrants".

"It would be difficult to find a more extravagant and careless system of land distribution than that of the period 1763-1841 in the British North American colonies." Not only was it wasteful; it was also inconsistent. Durham said, "In no two colonies, in fact, has the same system prevailed at the same time." Absentee landlords, who most often received the land because of favoritism or as a reward and usually in the hope of speculative profit, made little or no effort to improve it. The effect upon immigration and on settlement of such waste lands was, to say the least, inhibiting. Lack of development by the owner meant that it was often impossible to tell who the owner was. This left large blocks of land idle, preventing proper immigrant settlement. The evils of such a land system meant that potential settlers for Canada were lost, as the stream of immigrants to the United States became even greater.

^{1.} MacDonald, Norman, Canada 1763-1841: Immigration and Settlement, (Longmans Green, 1939), p. 512.



That the British government was really not interested in the colonies seems to be all too evident: "There was no surer way of emptying the House of Commons -- unless it were an oration by Edmond Burke, or a horse race -- than by introducing a discussion of the colonial affairs."

In the face of the evidence, the inefficiency and blundering of Downing Street are unquestionable. Because this is so, it is difficult indeed to substantiate charges that there was a concerted effort by governments of the day to people Canada with British stock in order to overwhelm the French element in Canada. Of course statistics show there was considerable British immigration into Canada, but that was more the result of luck and circumstances than from any real planned effort on the government's part.

From 1825-50 Canada experienced a tremendous influx of immigrants but this had little to do with government actions. The processes of immigration and settlement during this period were spontaneous, unsought and for the most part unassisted.

Lord Durham drew attention to this fact and objected to the lack in Britain of any systematic emigration stating it was "emigration without forethought, preparation, method or system of any kind." This is what caused him to emphasize, in his Report, the need for a British emigration policy (although what he had to say on the subject reflects his friend Wakefield's

^{1.} Ibid., p. 525




ideas; he personally was pre-occupied with the larger, more fundamental problem of the need for the colonies to run their own affairs, i.e., self government). Incidentally, the only government action that was taken by the Province of Canada was designed to deter rather than to encourage immigration — for in 1848 the tax was doubled and, although warned by Lord Grey that it would tend to direct the stream of immigrants elsewhere, the new colonial law raising the tax was passed. The result was a drastic drop in British immigration for Canada although during the same period other areas such as United States,

Australia and New Zealand maintained their high rates of flow.

Lack of ethnic unity in the country caused uncertainty and disagreement over the nature of the national goals which should be pursued. Certainly policy was never clearly defined. In retrospect it seems that the obvious course of action would have been to populate the country as quickly as possible with enough people to ensure a proper economic base for our future industrial development. It was an era of migration and Canada was a vast land with few people: but the logical solution, i.e., an *open door* allowing unlimited immigration, was to naive a policy for politicians of the day, enmeshed as they were in the net of racial-religious bigotry and political expediency.


One explanation for the persistent charges about an alleged "determined policy" on the part of the British Government to "fill the country with British emigrants" lies with the famous Lord Durham's Report. He advocated a policy of 'anglification' of Lower Canada as one way to end the critical situation in that area.



Lord Durham was well known (and feared) for his lack of tact and restraint, and had in England, because of his long association with radical reforms, been called 'Radical Jack'. In fact this was the reason why it was felt that both Lord Grey and Lord Melbourne were happy to have him 'in exile', as it were, off on foreign missions abroad, one of which was the assignment in British North America. This appointment he refused, at first, but finally accepted reluctantly as a duty.

Certainly Durham was no expert on Canada. In fact, he had no knowledge at all of the Canadian situation, but he was famous for having the courage of his convictions as well as for a keen quality of mind. These and his ability to size up a situation seemed to make him eminently suited for this new task. What was the situation that faced him in the country which had just undergone uprisings and outright rebellion?

In his own oft-quoted words he found: "two nations warring in the bosom of a single state,...a struggle not of principles but of races". His proposed remedy was not surprising. His motives were not based on prejudice of or hatred for the French-Canadian; on the contrary he found them most agreeable people but, from an objective viewpoint, he felt they could never prosper in a continent which was fast becoming overwhemingly English in language, customs and aspirations. He simply felt that the French Canadians could not hold out for their own way of life and, if they persisted in trying to, it would only cause great hardship and unhappiness and friction for all concerned. Accordingly, he felt the logical answer was assimilation to the point of disappearance.



Of course, in this he revealed his gross underestimation of French-Canadian character, but the point of relevance to this study is that up to that time the British government had had no real policy in this regard. Stupid and arrogant, the British Government was indeed; high-handed and blind to the real situation in British North America, yes; woefully ignorant of the real needs of Canadians, undoubtedly; but conducting a determined emigration program designed to overwhelm the French, no. The simple answer is that they and no policy at all. The reason was indeed ironic — they did not give the matter that much thought?


It was a government concerned with its own affairs and only incidentally with the colonies. There was need for a more democratic form of government -- in fact, the time was ripe for "self government" or "Responsible Government" as the cry became (although the two concepts are not the same thing, but this is not the place for subtle distinctions). Durham's Report brought Responsible Government to Canada and for that all Canadians, both French and English-speaking, have to thank him. In fact, all the self-governing dominions, former colonies of Britain, owe their freedom to this statesman and his famous Report. Certainly, it began a new period in colonial policy, as well as laying the foundation stone of Canadian democracy, and high praise is its due. Nevertheless, it did have weaknesses and it contained many inaccuracies. After all, Durham was in Canada only five months and his work was hampered by political problems of great dimension to say nothing of personal, chronic ill health.



The aspect of the Report which was to prove a thorn in the side of Canadian unity for decades to come was, of course, his failure regarding the French-Canadian situation. He diagnosed the problem but prescribed the wrong medicine. He made the mistake of listening to the wrong people for an assessment of this aspect of the problem, instead of spending the necessary time in personal discussions with the leaders of the French-Canadian moderates. His contacts with them were limited to a few social gatherings, with no really fruitful meetings for serious discussions... "One cannot but feel that if Durham had himself gone to Lafontaine in that straight forward way of his, mutual understanding would have been developed" ... His failure to understand the French-Canadian 'problem' led him to his famous (or infamous) recommendation to 'anglify Lower Canada' and make Canada British -- a solution which the French Canadians could hardly accept. Indeed, they have never forgiven Lord Durham for this; his comments are still quoted by all French-Canadian nationalists.

But the fact is that this part of the report was never acted upon. It was criticized strongly by political leaders at the time and has been, of course, ever since. Subsequent Governors-General were not blind to the impracticability of such a policy and at no time was implementation ever considered.

^{1.} Chester New, Lord Durham's Mission to Canada, an abridgment edited by H.W. McCready, (McClelland and Stewart Limited, 1963), p. 99.



Certainly the British government announced again and again during this period (1763-1867) that, aside from being moved by the growing humanitarianism to provide safe transportation and slight improvements in conditions, it would have no part in encouraging emigration by influencing the individual's decision to emigrate or not to emigrate. There were many reasons for this lack of interest on the government's part. While some argued that any attempt to promote emigration to the British colonies would mean overwhelming costs (and it is interesting to note that the business community felt an emigrant in United States or South America, etc. was just as useful as one in British North America in terms of world trade!), the laissezfaire policies of the day were chiefly responsible for the government's action (or rather lack of action). Certainly British governments acted only when pressured to do so by the landlords and Members of Parliament of those in need. "The appeals from the people were the force that pushed governments, Whig or Tory, to provide, first, assistance in emigration and, later, information and protection" ... "When the Whig ministry fell in 1852 and prosperity for Great Britain was on the horizon and responsible government and free trade were changing the colonies, the day for vigonous imperial action on emigration to British America had passed. The colonies meanwhile were taking control of immigration for themselves."1


^{1.} Ibid., Cowan, p. 231



In 1852, for example, the Bureau of Agriculture was instituted in Canada and it was charged with the duty of encouraging immigration. While further references will be made in a later section to details of policies as such, the purpose at this point is to emphasize that nowhere can one find substance for the charge that a determined effort was made through official government immigration policy to change the ethnic composition of Canada, although external factors and the general economic conditions of the times gave rise to British emigration and that ultimate effect.

With specific reference to the Canadian West, virtually the preserve of the fur companies from 1670 to 1869, very little settlement took place (with the exception of the tiny Selkirk Settlement group on the Red River -- largely due to private initiative of one individual) until after the area began to be carved into provinces and the governments instituted the practice of granting free homestead land to attract settlers.

The long history of land grants, especially as set out in the Dominion Lands Act of 1872 and the land regulations of 1882 reveal the Canadian government's generosity, similar to the earlier wasteful policy of the British Government in this respect, and again point up the government's lack of any consistent overall immigration policy. The readiness to allow settlement generally to proceed at the discretion of railway or shipping companies' colonization policies (based on profit




motives as they undoubtedly were) rather than to delineate legislation clearly reflects the government philosophy of the day. One can only conclude that it left much to be desired and that an immigration policy of a truly positive nature did not really exist.

With the coming into Confederation of British Columbia in 1871 and the subsequent fulfillment of MacDonald's promise to build a railway from coast to coast, it became possible for immigration to the empty western lands to begin in earnest and it progressed reasonably well until the early 1890's.

During this whole period, of course, steamship companies and railways joined the various land companies in backing immigration, as it made for 'good business'. Certainly shipping interests benefitted from the immediate prospect (immigrant fares) and also from the long-term view, considering the over-all increase in world trade and commerce.

We need only cite the Canadian Pacific Railway which, from its founding in 1880, had a strong vested interest and was consequently greatly concerned with immigration; the Hudson's Bay Company which shared this concern had, of course, been in operation much earlier.

The roles played by such companies in the settlement of the country, particularly after 1880 and especially in the vast area west of the Lakehead, require a study in themselves.




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For the purposes of this paper, however, let us simply state that governments seemed glad enough to leave 'colonization' to them. During certain periods, in fact, they actually used the agents of shipping and railway companies to obtain immigrants (particularly agricultural and domestic workers) by paying them on a per capita basis for bringing people into the country.

Government action to populate the prairies did not really get underway (apart from some specific efforts made by provincial governments as outlined elsewhere) until the imaginative period of Sir Clifford Sifton's term of office as Minister of the Interior. His foresight and persistence led him to begin, in 1896, a federal government policy of actively bringing in immigrants to develop the West. Even here, external factors played a large role, since the success of the policy was assured mainly because of the brighter world wheat market prospects. Improved economic conditions generally were exceedingly welcome after a long depression that had put the damper on any great flow of immigration.

Because of the vision brought to the question of immigration by Clifford Sifton, a policy of national development was to receive the direction and guidance which heretofore had been conspicuously lacking, particularly with respect to any conscious

One cannot read through the Sifton papers in the Archives without becoming convinced that this man had one major ambition and that was to develop the West by an immigration policy that would be strong and effective, yet one looks in vain for any indication that it was either a pro-British or anti-French policy.)



and determined government plan for opening up and settling the west. Sifton went to Ottawa firmly convinced that the country had been standing still for years and would never become a nation if the federal government did not act with despatch.

Sifton believed that:

The first thing to do was to settle the empty West with producing farmers: this was the second, third, fourth and fifth thing to do.

He had to convince his Cabinet colleagues to approve this course of action and, while it was not easy, he managed to do so. As he pointed out himself later in a public address in 1908:

Nobody thought that I could make that change (to fill the empty West). My colleagues did not believe that I could, and they did not believe in the methods that I adopted; nor did my opponents believe in them. I had my own opinion, and I backed my own opinions.

When Sifton became Minister of the Interior he changed the government's policy of land grants to railways. Vast tracts had been turned over to the companies for selection of particular lands, but they were in no hurry to make these selections because of the necessity, once selection was made, to pay provincial and municipal taxes. Sifton's policy was to force the railways' hand to take action and get on with actual settlement so that the soil could be productive.

A moribund Department of Interior, locked in red-tape, had long frustrated any genuine attempt to handle land disputes

^{1.} John W. Dafoe "Clifford Sifton in Relation to His Times" Toronto, (Macmillan, 1931) p. 131




or correspondence with potential homesteaders, etc. Sifton completely re-organized and rejuvenated the whole Department. He was not concerned with getting a high price for land, but rather "to settle" was the aim. Prosperity would follow and national development would take care of itself. Sifton infused every person in his Department with this policy of placing the settler before all else. If a man were serious in his desire to become a productive settler then the whole Department was at his service. He was not just a case file number but an individual and was treated as such.

If he was a white man, in both senses of that word, he could come from anywhere in the world and he was made welcome, and put to work with no questions asked as to his race, his religion, his language or his previous conditions of servitude.

Proof that it was really the farmer or genuine productive settler in whom Sifton was interested is indicated by the fact that in Great Britain, for example, efforts were confined largely to the north of England and Scotland and areas from which agriculturalists could be found. He did this by doubling the benuses of steamship agents in those areas and cutting them as much as possible in the more industrialized south.


From the very beginning, Mr. Sifton had his eye on the United States as a country from which desirable settlers could be drawn. This was wholly original with him; it had not occurred to anybody else that from the United States to which the landless of the world were trekking, immigrants for Canada could be obtained.

l. <u>Ibid</u>., p. 136 2. <u>Ibid</u>., p. 140



Sifton has often been accused by the French-Canadian critics of having favoured the British and determinedly keeping out the French-speaking. There is simply no basis in fact to support such a view. He was interested in placing good agriculturalists on the lands and he didn't care where he obtained them, what language they spoke nor what religion they held. His was, pure and simple, a policy of getting good farmers from wherever he could get them. There is no doubt that he was hated by a great many French Canadians but this seems to have been because of his attitude on the 'School question'. However, one cannot justly say that this had any bearing on his immigration policy. In fact, contrary to having an anti-French bias, he even tried to induce those French-Canadians who had been lured to the New England States to return to the land in Canada. He set up a small but efficient immigration organization for the sole purpose of encouraging repatriation of these French-speaking Canadians from the industrial centres of Massachusetts, Connecticut, and Rhode Island, etc.

This writer was unable to discover, in the Sifton papers, evidence of any particular dislike of French Canadians or discrimination against them on the part of Sifton who was, incidentally, aware of their criticism of him. What may have accounted for some of the French-Canadian animosity was the fact that Sifton definitely did not like Italian immigration, but the reason was not because they were Roman Catholic (as was charged many times,) but rather because he claimed they did not make good agricultural settlers — they were not farmers. Sifton was determined to bring in the types which he felt were the ones Canada needed. To him, that category, pure and simple, was the farmer and consequently he did his best to encourage immigration of potential land settlers only and to discourage any other kind regardless of their country of origin.



He turned, with more fruitful results, to the continent of Europe where he had a study made of immigration potential.

He learned that:
Germany was practically closed to immigration
work by restrictive laws; that for the comparatively limited emigration from the Scandinavian
countries, Canada could not compete with the
United States; that a limited number of immigrants
could not be got from Belgium and practically
none from France.

Austria and Hungary were far more productive sources and the peasants from these areas seeking land were welcomed with open arms. His famous words,


I think a stalwart peasant in a sheep-skin coat, born on the soil, whose forefathers have been farmers for ten generations, with a stout wife and a half-dozen children, is good quality.

have often been quoted as summing up his policy, which indeed they did. For this policy he was bitterly attacked but he defended it at every opportunity. He ardently believed that Ukrainians and Galicians, or the 'scum of Europe' as his opponents called them, could indeed make a contribution to Canada. He never wavered in his support of the "tiller of the soil", regardless of origin.

Certainly his was no exclusively pro-British policy, but purely and simply a 'pro-farmer' or agriculturalist view. In fact, some of the countries in Europe objected to his policies.

To mention only one, the German government of the day launched an official complaint against what it termed "a criminal attempt to lure our fellow countrymen to this desolate and arctic region.

^{1.} Ibid., p. 141




Sifton's policy as already indicated above had many opponents at home in Canada. He was viciously attacked for bringing in, in particular, Doukhobours and Galicians (now referred to as Ukrainians). As Sifton himself put it in a letter November 11, 1901 to John Dafoe, editor of the Winnipeg Free Press:

The cry against the Doukhobours and Galicians is the most absolutely ignorant and absurd thing that I have ever known in political life. There is simply no question in regard to the advantage of these people and I do not think there is anyone in the North West who is so stupid as not to know it.

is the most contemptible possible policy because it is one that does not depend upon reason. As you know, you can excite the prejudice of one nationality against another by simply keeping up an agitation. You can excite the French against the English or the English against the French or the Germans against the English or vice versa. All you have to do is keep hammering away and appealing to their prejudices and in the course of time you will work up an excitement, but a more ignorant and unpatriotic policy could not be imagined.

In another letter to Dafoe (August 5, 1903) Sifton, in speaking of attacks on his immigration policy had this to say:

There is, in reality, no legitimate ground for criticism in this connection. There is no country in the world that ever got a larger proportion of good and useful people among its immigrants than we are getting now. While the United States is getting thousands of labourers from Southern Europe who are flocking to their cities and towns, we are getting agriculturalists almost without exception who are going directly upon the land... The immigration work which is going on at the present time, resulting in planting large numbers of farmers on our North Western prairies, is the one work which is propelling Canada forward and laying the foundation for her future prosperity.




45.

During Sifton's term as Minister in charge of immigration over one half million immigrants arrived in Canada and the flow continued to increase annually until the peak year 1913. But while he favored the 'stalwart peasant farmer' as the best immigrant, this did not mean that he ignored discriminating selection. In fact he firmly believed that there must be means for careful selection.

Even years later, (November 18, 1920), he wrote of northern European immigrants (Belgian, Danish, Norwegian and Swedish particularly) as settlers for high-class lands, "I believe 100,000 first class farmers could be got in the next two or three years and they could be worth a million immigrants of the usual drifter class." Then for the second-class land he still preferred Central European peasants for their industriousness and perseverance. He detested the practice of giving "government bonuses", saying that he had "never known anybody who was materially assisted by the government to amount to anything."

He felt government schemes were necessary, of course, to bring


Note: In an effort to eliminate unscrupulous individual booking agents, Sifton had had an exclusive arrangement with a company called the North Atlantic Trading Co. which had the responsibility of selecting desirable immigrants and making bookings to Canada for them. Despite assurances by Sir Wilfrid Laurier and strong evidence that there was no basis in fact for criticism of this arrangement, political charges were such as to cause cancellation of the contract by the government and thus, (according to Sifton), means of discriminating selection were lost, much to the detriment of Canada®s immigration policy at the time.



the people in and that advances might have to be made, but that they should be charges against the land and the individual should be required to pay them off after a reasonable period.

To Sir Clifford Sifton the number one problem of the day was how to find and keep the right kind of settlers for the western prairies in order to develop the vast potential of that region. With this done he felt confident that difficulties of national development would be solved. Certainly the prairie provinces we know today owe their success, in large measure, to the vision and courage of this forceful immigration minister.


As far as ethnic composition of the population is concerned, it is clear that the first change of any magnitude same about as a result of his policy. Of course, in 1763 French was definitely the predominant population component of the country. Over the next one hundred years or so, conditions referred to above changed this until in 1871, the first census, there was a total of 3,485,761 in the roughly approximate proportion of one French-speaking to two non-French (mostly British). But Sifton's vigorous policy of 'peopling' the west in order to develop the vast stretches of wheatland and to build up a population along the lines of steel which spanned the country from sea to sea, changed this by attracting immigrants from both northern and central Europe. A new wave, this time Austrians, Poles, Hungarians, Russians and many others, broke on the shores and the ethnic composition of the country became as varied as the




ingredients of the proverbial Irish stew. The basis of what was later to be referred to as the *Canadian mosaic* had indeed been laid.

Up until World War I and particularly after the new provinces of Saskatchewan and Alberta were formed, Canada simmigration flow swelled to a virtual flood, with the year 1913 representing high tide of 400,870 immigrants. Of that year's arrivals, only 150,000 came from the British Isles. Again, prosperous economic conditions and external factors such as the pre-war boom figured largely as causes of this tremendously increased influx of immigrants. The 1914-18 War itself, of course, caused a blockage in the flow which was not really removed until 1921 (although some British immigrants began to arrive in 1920). A post-war depression of some two to three years placed a natural brake on immigration despite the opening up of new lands in the Peace River District and the more northern parts of the prairies. A new peak (see table II) is clearly discernible between 1926-29, but this fell off sharply with the great depression of the 1930°s.

^{1.} According to John Murray Gibbon who published a book called Canadian Mosaic in 1938, this term 'mosaic' as applied to the Canadian people, was first used by an American writer, Victoria Hayward, in a book Romantic Canada, written in collaboration with Edith Watson and published in 1922. Then in 1926 Kate A. Foster published Our Canadian Mosaic and still later, in 1965, John Porter uses the term in his book The Vertical Mosaic.



While external factors played a role here once more, the domestic policy of restrictive immigration measures also contributed to the decline. Because World War II followed closely on the heels of this disastrous depression, there was no real resumption of immigration until the post-World War II years, when conditions were so radically changed that it is essential for us to treat this period separately and in greater detail within the context of the next section, which deals with general policy.



CHAPTER III - FEDERAL LEGISLATION AND POLICY

A. General

Traditionally, neither imaginative vision nor humanitarian concern has characterized this country's immigration policy and practices. As a country of the New World, Canada was a natural magnet for migrants from the crowded Old World. That she stood to gain or lose, depending upon her attitude toward these people, is a fact which Canada has been slow to appreciate. What importance has been attached to immigration? What legislation has the government seen fit to enact in this regard?

Since a complete compilation of the legislation and of amendments to the regulations by innumerable orders in council would fill a good-sized pamphlet, a full discussion of them is impractical in this particular study. All that can be attempted here is a brief reference to that legislation which has set the guidelines, as it were, for Canadian policy toward immigrants.

From 1763-1867, of course, the <u>British government</u> was responsible, as had been the French government prior to that. (See Historical Background section.) Actually the first 'Canadian' legislative action was taken in 1794 when Lower Canada passed "An Act Respecting Aliens"



which, because of attitude of the clergy, was directed primarily against the agents of the French Revolution. Similar acts were placed on the books in 1798 and 1828 by Nova Scotia and then after 1840, by Upper and Lower Canada in due course. While by no means very active in the field, the British government still bore the administrative costs of what immigration work there was. This included payment of the expenses of immigration agents, such as A.C. Buchanan, Sr., who had been appointed in 1828 and later, in 1836, those of his nephew, A.C. Buchanan, Jr. However, after 1854, the entire cost of the Canadian Immigration Department activities was met by Canadian authorities.

In 1852 the Bureau of Agriculture of the Canadian Government (which had been created by the 1840 Act of Union) was made responsible for encouraging immigration, and for legislating and administering the regulations. This arrangement continued until Confederation when, constitutionally, immigration became a matter for concurrent jurisdiction between the federal and provincial governments of the new Canada.

At a dominion-provincial conference in Ottawa in October 1868, agreement was reached whereby the central government of Canada would establish and pay the costs for an immigration office in London, one on the Continent




and any others considered necessary from time to time.

It was also to bear the costs of the seaport and other offices in Canada, as well as any expenses incurred from the quarantine posts, as per the Quarantine Act of May 1868.

Provinces could appoint European agents if desired, and were to provide the Dominion Immigration Branch with information regarding lands and opportunities available in their own areas. Provinces were also to appoint delegates to meet three times yearly at an Ottawa conference to properly coordinate dominion-provincial action in immigration matters. The 1868 Conference was followed by the Immigration Act of June 22. 1869 which, in effect, gave legislative confirmation to the policy agreed upon at the meeting. Details were set out regarding a capitation tax (later abolished), certain protective measures for immigrant welfare and other regulations -- such as the number of passengers allowed on ships, where they were to land, and so forth. There is no official record available of the discussions that took place when this Act was passed, since House of Commons Debates were not published until 1875 although, of course, press clippings are helpful. The Act of 1869

^{1.} Chapter 10, Statutes of 1869. (Assented to June 22, 1869 to take effect January 1, 1870).




was followed in ensuing years by numerous orders-in- council covering many aspects, such as inspection of incoming immigrant ships, assisted passage arrangements, incorporation of immigrant aid societies, protection clauses for immigrants, and a host of similar matters.

The Act, in fact, contained the principle of exclusion
-- as seen in Section 16, prohibiting the landing of pauper
or destitute immigrants, etc. -- along with other restrictive clauses. These were the forerunners of the 'prohibited
classes' regulations of subsequent and recent years.

In addition to the 1868 Conference, the provinces and the central government at Ottawa held further conferences in 1869, 1870, 1871 and 1874 at which various questions of labour needs, reception arrangements for immigrants and many other details were discussed.

Consolidations of the 1869 Act and the regulations issued under it took place periodically, such as in 1886 and 1906. Then a new Act, passed in 1910, introduced such features as Ministers' Permits and Examination Procedures, as well as extending the 'prohibited classes' to include 'subversive'elements advocating the 'overthrow by force of constituted law and authority'.



While the Chinese Immigration Act of 1923 was enacted and several orders-in-council were passed, it was not until 1927 that another consolidation was effected. However, no basic changes were made to the terms of the 1910 Act. The Act itself was not revised until 1952 when the present Act (Chapter 325, R.S.C., 1952) became the legislation covering all aspects of immigration; it became effective June 1, 1953 and is still in force (1966).

An interesting yardstick of the importance of immigration in the eyes of the Canadian government is revealed when one observes the places which the Immigration Branch has occupied in the departmental or organizational structure of the government. Briefly, we find in the years following Confederation that the work of the Immigration Branch fell to the Department of Agriculture — the Immigration Act of 1869 being assigned to that department for administration. For several years immigration was, in fact, the chief work of the Department of Agriculture. Then in 1892 immigration was re-assigned to the Department of the Interior. It was administered by this department until 1917, when the Department of Immigration and Colonization was constituted.


Canada, Statutes, 31 Vict. c. 53 (1869)
 Canada, Statutes, 8-9 Geo. V, c. 3 (1918)



It is significant that during this period (especially 1910-1914) there was a record high immigration although, in the eyes of the federal government, immigration did not rate a department of its own! Again, it is hardly necessary to mention that the large number of arrivals in the peak period was due not so much to government policy as to the general world economic situation. With the slowing down of economic opportunity in the United States, migration to Canada -- a country just beginning to expand -- promised obvious advantages, especially as hundreds of thousands of acres of fertile land on the Canadian prairies were vacant and awaiting the settler's plow. The Canadian Pacific Railway and other private interests were only too willing to promote such settlement. It scarcely mattered what policy Canada followed, so long as it was not completely restrictive, for the "century was Canada s with or without imagination and driving force in the Immigration Branch" . 1

Needless to say, World War I interrupted this enormous flow and when peace came the situation had changed greatly. For the years 1918 - 1936, it was the function of the immigration officials, operating under the newly-established Department of Immigration and Colonization, to


^{1.} Fowke, V.C., Canadian Agricultural Policy, p. 178



administer the Immigration Act and the Chinese Immigration Act. However, in the immediate post-World War I years, immigration was virtually halted until Canadian ex-soldiers were all re-integrated into the economy. In 1923 efforts were begun to induce settlement of family units and the first assisted passage agreement was made with the United Kingdom government. A few years later the federal government entered into special agreement with certain provinces to bring in boys for selected farm homes. The British government was also involved in this project and shared expenses incurred.

One could say that during these years (and until the 1930's when economic depression set in, virtually closing off immigration entirely) legislation did, in fact, favour the British immigrant. However, the total number entering the country was not very substantial (see Table II). It is important to note that over this period there was little expression of opinion of any kind, for or against immigration, by the French Canadians.

In 1936, the Department of Immigration and Colonization became the Immigration Branch of the Department of Mines and Resources (newly created at that time). Policy was definitely restrictive over these years, with entry allowed to only a handful of farm workers and domestics, the period might well be termed "the Static Thirties" for immigration



was certainly at a standstill. Rather significantly, the Immigration Branch commented on the smallness of the numbers:

Were it not for the fact that the Canadian public has been accustomed to small immigration returns from year to year, the statement now published that Canada with its vast territory and immense natural resources received last year only 1300 newcomers per month would be a matter of comment, having in mind the contribution that immigration has made to the opening up of the Dominion in the past.

While many Canadians disagreed with the official policy, this body of opinion was not of sufficient political consequence to be effective. Several years were to pass before the interests of business and industry found the situation couductive to the exertion of political pressure to change legislation. (This situation was to come about only with the post-war boom in Canadian industrial development, which brought demands for skilled and unskilled labour.)

Meanwhile the Canadian economy, depending as it did on world conditions, dictated the immigration regulations.

It was commonly feared that any relaxing of the restrictions would cause greater unemployment.

^{1.} Canada, Department of Mines and Resources, Immigration Branch Annual Report for fiscal year ended March, 1938, p. 234.




The Canadian government did nothing towards advocating industrial expansion programs or constructively developing unused natural resources which might have removed this fear. There was indeed no lack of eager applicants who seemed to have more faith in the country's future than had its own government.

It would have been possible at any time during recent years to have obtained tens of thousands of immigrants by the simple expedient of letting down the bars erected in 1930 to protect the Dominion against an influx of surplus labour...

Towards the latter end of the "thirties", as the great economic depression ran its course, the accompanying political disturbances in Europe and elsewhere gave rise to a relatively new phenomenon, the refugee type of immigrant.

These refugees, unwilling or unable to stay in their own countries, were attracted to countries in the "new" world, notably Canada. But the Canadian immigration regulations, restrictive to a fault, were not designed to accommodate such immigrants. That there existed humanitarian reasons necessitating some modifications to these restrictions was undeniable. Nevertheless, the

^{1.} Canada, Department of Mines and Resources, Immigration Branch Annual Report for the fiscal year ended March, 1939, p. 268.




regulations were not materially changed; the exceptions Canada made for such people were few.

The Minister, simply by issuing orders-in-council under the Immigration Act could, if he wished, waive the restrictions in respect to named persons. But this was done only for those with money, specifically those bringing new industry or capital to Canada, or for those who happened to be technicians or skilled workers whose services were particularly required in this country. For example, for the year 1939, "...the number of industrialists or persons of other occupations admitted by special regulation was 69 (and they had a capital of \$4,200,000).1

Such exceptions, then, were hardly motivated by purely humanitarian instincts. Even when war broke out and refugees clamoured for entry in increasing numbers, Canadian immigration restrictions remained. Certain groups of Europeans were allowed on a non-immigrant basis or granted temporary asylum; British war evacuees, especially children, were admitted, but again this was on a temporary basis for the duration of the war only.

^{1.} Canada, Department of Mines and Resources, Immigration Branch Annual Report for fiscal year 1939-40, p. 217.



Generally speaking, then, the Canadian attitude to immigration was restrictive and, specifically, as a closer look at the Canadian Immigration Act reveals, it was definitely a "closed door" policy for Asiatics.

(Details of this will be discussed later in this chapter.)

Incidentally, Asiatics were barred by certain provincial legislation, also, as Chapter IV will indicate but, practically speaking, all legislation governing immigration into Canada, Asiatic or otherwise, has been of a federal nature. Such provincial regulations as have existed will be discussed later but, in actual practice over the years, the law which regulates immigration is a federal statute — the Immigration Act. It has been amended or revised from time to time, but opinions differ as to whether or not such revisions have always adequately met existing needs.

The task of administering this Act falls to the

Immigration Branch of the federal government. This Branch,
as mentioned above, has undergone many re-organizations and
been the victim of constant shuffling from department to
department. As of January 18, 1950 it received another home
this time in the Department of Citizenship and

Immigration — the department which had become responsible
for immigration matters with the coming into force of the




Department of Citizenship and Immigration Act 1949, c. 16.

The passage of this Act caused the major departmental reorganization of 1950. New emphasis on citizenship meant assisting new Canadians to become integrated into Canadian society, although there was no intention of providing service individually, since this is considered constitutionally to be a local responsibility. The federal government must tread warily to avoid infringing on matters of local autonomy; therefore the Citizenship Branch of this new department did not itself plan, for example, to enter into the question of language training. It was, however, more than willing to assist provincial departments of education and other relevant departments of the provinces to do all they could in this respect.

The main emphasis in the new Department created in 1949 was still on matters of immigration, but administrative changes were made in both the overseas and Canadian operations.

Internal changes in the structure of the Department and re-organizations generally have been common place in the years since then. Recently ¹ during a cabinet "shuffle",

^{1.} The Hon. L.B. Pearson made the announcement December 17, 1965.



another major change was announced by the Prime Minister.

The Department of Citizenship and Immigration as such will very shortly cease to be and all functions of that department other than immigration will be transferred to other departments while immigration and those sections now in the Department of Labour that deal with manpower placement and employment services, technical and vocational training and civilian rehabilitation will become the responsibility of the present Minister of Citizenship and Immigration but with a new portfolio -- Minister of Manpower.

With so many changes in organization, and particularly in senior personnel, over the last two decades, administration of the Immigration Act and Regulations is bound to leave something to be desired. The task of the staff at the Ottawa Headquarters of the Immigration Branch is multiple. It is responsible for pelicy, in all its forms, regarding the encouragement of immigration and the selection of immigrants. In addition, of œurse, it handles all matters relating to the examination of tourists and all others who seek entry into Canada as well as exclusion or deportation of prohibited or undesirable individuals. Settlement of immigrants after arrival is also a function of the Branch. Officers in the many field posts both at home and abroad are likewise




responsible to the Minister in Ottawa, from whom all the regulations emanate.

The Act itself has not been amended since 1952 in spite of major changes in the Regulations which, in effect, have altered completely the intent of government policy as will be discussed more fully later on in this chapter.

Immigration laws are not to be found wholly within the Act, however, the regulations made under the Act by orders-in-council provide the framework required to implement the purposes of the Act. The Act itself merely lists the "prchibited classes", sets forth safeguards for immigrant reception and regulates the shipping or general transportation companies involved. Immigration Regulations, as set out in orders-in-council, on the other hand, enumerate the "admissible" classes which vary according to the immigration policy of a particular government at any given time.

During periods of general encouragement to agricultural immigrants, such as before and around the turn of the century, the only tests were whether the immigrant had a

^{1.} It was by this method that the government's program for Displaced Persons was carried out shortly after the war -- 1947-51 -- thereby allowing admissions which otherwise would have been prohibited under the Act.




government policy became restrictive after World War I and, with the exception of a few years in the "twenties", remained so. During the "thirties", by virtue of Order-in-Council P.C. 695 (March 21, 1931), everyone was prohibited except: (a) British subjects with means to support themselves while seeking employment, (b) United States citizens, similarly, (c) the wife and children under 18 of a person who could support them, (d) agriculturalists with means to farm on their own account and (e) the fiancée of a resident in a position to marry and support her.

Such regulations as these were not conducive to immigration on any scale; they were, in fact, most definitely "prohibitive". The restrictions remained substantially the same until the first signs of relaxation came after World War II.

Considerable agitation for change was necessary before regulations were issued widening the admissible classes to include, eventually, refugees and displaced persons.

The Act describes certain individuals who are not admissible, no matter where they come from. Among such "inadmissible" classes are included various




"persons likely to become a public charge". If, having been admitted to Canada, persons become total public charges, they are subject to deportation. In the 1930's this was an escape clause for officials who did not hesitate to use it, in many cases even when the individuals expressed strong objections to returning to their lands of origin.

In a period of 35 years, deportations have amounted to upwards of 59,000 persons ... becoming a public charge was for many years the principal cause for deportation.

This regulation with regard to deportation on the grounds of being a "public charge" remains in the Act today (1966) but with slight changes as introduced in 1952. Department officials claim however, that when they deport anyone it is usually for reasons other than that of being a public charge. (Since deportation policy is not the concern of this study, we cannot discuss it further at this time, but it is a complex area which researchers might well place under close examination.) The unfairness of such legislation merely points up the Canadian government's past lack of conern for the immigrant for his own sake and the fact that, in general, policy has been narrow and selfish in principle rather than humanitarian.

^{1.} Canada, Department of Mines and Resources, <u>Immigration</u>
Branch Annual Report for fiscal year ended March
1937, p. 306.



Added to the generally restrictive character of the Immigration Act was an even more serious aspect, its racially discriminatory nature. Discrimination with regard to the Asiatics over the years has been most pronounced. Government has based its arguments thus: first, Chinese, Japanese and Indians were "unassimilable", climatically, socially and otherwise; secondly, they had a "lower standard of living".

That such charges are, in the final analysis,
quite groundless was of no consequence. After 1923, not
only were further entries restricted, but a Chinese
resident in Canada could not bring his wife and children
in, even if he could support them at a much higher
standard of living than thousands of other Canadians might
enjoy. (This regulation continued in force until the
Chinese Immigration Act was repealed in 1947.)

The question of Chinese Immigration is not really within the terms of reference of this study but one must make brief reference to the fact that Canadian policy, with regard to Asiatics and colored persons, has been discriminatory in both theory and practice from the very beginning (at both the provincial and federal levels). As early as 1878 restrictions, in the form of special taxes, were imposed by the British Columbia legislature.



Although declared <u>ultra vires</u> by the Supreme Court of the Province, discrimination against Orientals was practiced by the local legislature until 1908.

Meanwhile the federal agents had imposed a \$50 head tax on Chinese entering the country. Government representatives, merchants, scientists, students and tourists were not obliged to pay the tax but from 1885-1900 all others paid \$50 each. Then in 1900 the tax was doubled; in 1903 it was raised to \$500 and it was not removed until 1923 when the Canadian government adopted the principle of allowing entry (provided passports were visaed by a Canadian officer in China) of certain specified classes only. The policy still remained discriminatory until 1962, when new regulations were introduced in the House of Commons by Immigration Minister Fairclough.

Needless to say, the Chinese were not the only nonwhite immigrants to be restricted entry -- although the
situation differed slightly for some of the others such
as East Indians and Japanese. The special treaties of
1894 and 1911 between Great Britain and Japan (to which
Canada adhered) allowed residents of one to travel
(and reside if they desired) in the country of the other.
But subsequent agreements were made with Japan by which
she voluntarily restricted the numbers emigrating to
Canada. Typical of these was the "Gentlemen's Agreement"
negotiated in 1907.



Immigrants from India were not directly excluded, but an Order-in-Council of 1908 required a "continuous journey from the country of origin." This constituted an effective barrier, as there was no direct steamship connection between India and Canada. When a group of 400 enterprising Indians, in an attempt to test the law, hired a Japanese boat and made a continuous journey arriving in Vancouver May 21, 1914, they were refused admission. This gave rise to unpleasant incidents and ricting, but still the fundamental restrictions remained.

Certainly, during these years no one could possibly have defended Canadian legislation and policy as anything other than a screen which filtered out all but those considered to be the elite of the human race. Citizens of nearly all the "coloured" countries in the world were effectively denied entry to Canada by the Immigration law although this was not explicity stated in the Act. A very subtle policy was followed, however, which ensured that only those "suitable" were given permission to enter.


Criticism abounded, but one administration after another delayed any revision to the Act. Certainly Department officials had long been dissatisfied with the untenable positions into which they were constantly being forced in their attempts to administer the law with its mulifarious, and often conflicting, regulations. They



urged successive ministers to revise the Act, but one government after another failed to do so, some on the grounds that if they did a flood of immigrants, particularly unskilled people, would swell the unemployment rolls. It was felt that this would have antagonized labour unions and all those Canadians out of work, to say nothing of being a sure way for the government of the day to lose votes. A much "safer" way to change a politically sensitive law or amend the Immigration Regulations is the relatively easy procedure of using "orders-in-council" or -- easier still -- departmental directives (instructions which govern the day-to-day operations of immigration officials in Canada and overseas). An order-incouncil is simple and quick, for Cabinet approval only is necessary. The revision can be drawn up by an immigration official, approved by the appropriate authority in the department and presented to the Cabinet by the Minister concerned.

Under the Immigration Act (Section 61) the Governor-in-Council (Cabinet) is given broad authority to enact these orders-in-council which may affect admission of individuals to the country. Prior to 1956 even departmental officials could interpret clauses in the Act to mean prohibition of this or that type of person and, in effect, admitted immigrants at their own discretion.


However, a major development concerning the Regulations



took place in 1956 which necessitated a positive definition of the "admissibility" clauses. The Supreme Court of Canada ruled February 9, 1956 that the Immigration Officers of the Department, as well as Special Inquiry Officers, had far too much discretion under Section 61 of the Immigration Act of 1952 in the matters of "admissibility" and that the Governor-General-in-Council's power to delegate authority in this instance was ultra vires. Consequently, section 20 of the Regulations set out under the above authority had to be amended to define quite clearly who was admissible and henceforth any changes must be made by Cabinet -- not just an Immigration Officer at his own discretion. The situation which gave rise to the "Brent" case was a result of the too liberal powers which followed Order-in-Council P.C. 2856. This order had come into effect June 9, 1950 and was, in fact, an extremely important revision of the Act. It had broadened the admissibility classes of unsponsored immigrants to such an extent that practically anyone could be admitted.

Referring to the new regulations, the Deputy Minister wrote to a Branch Director June 19, 1950, "Broadly speaking we say that anybody who is suitable, desirable and

^{1.} Attorney General of Canada vs. Brent - 1956, S.C.R., p. 318.




not an Asiatic may be admitted to Canada as an immigrant."
(The discrimination against Asiatics still seemed built-in to government philosophy.)

Nevertheless the revision actually changed the entire basis of the immigration operation. The new regulations permitted the Department to admit immigrants on a broad selective basis and this gave rise to a massive immigration program of a complicated nature.

It became increasingly evident, however, that orderse in-council were not enough. By 1952, the Act contained so many anomalies and was in such need of clarification that a revision could be postponed no longer. The legislation was so old that even some of the amendments which had been passed were inconsistent and out of tune with the new circumstances of the post-war period. Canada's new role on the international scene meant increased responsibilities; it became imperative that legislative action be taken to set out the Canadian government's position on immigration and a new bill was prepared.

Prior to enactment, the new immigration bill was the subject of careful scrutiny by special committees of the House and the Senate who heard evidence from representatives of non-governmental bodies vitally interested in the legislation.



As already indicated, the new Act of 1952 still remains in force but in 1962 changes in the Immigration Regulations made a major revision in the terms of admissibility of immigrants to Canada. This was done by an orderin-council changing Regulations; it was not a new Act nor was the Act itself technically amended. However, the operative part of the Act is really to be discovered in the Regulations, Part I and as the Minister (the Hon. Ellen Fairclough) stated in an announcement of the subject made to the House of Commons on January 19, 1962:

The most important provision of the new Regulations is Section 31 which is, in fact the core of Canada's immigration policy. The new regulation 31, replacing Section 20 of the former Regulations, lays primary stress on education, training and skills as the main condition of admissibility, regardless of the country of origin of the appli-cant. (Underlining is the writer's.) If a person can qualify on these grounds and has sufficient means to establish himself in Canada until he finds employment, or alternatively, is coming forward to approved employment, or with suitable plans for self-establishment in Canada, he or she is admissible, subject only to the normal requirements of good health, good character and so forth.

^{1.} The new Regulations were in two parts, the first of which was formally approved by the Governor-in-Council as P.C. 1962-86 of January 18, 1962, while the second part required only the approval of the Minister under Section 62 of the Immigration Act. These new Regulations consolidated, revised and replaced the various Regulations passed in the previous years, including those issued under previous ministerial authority.



This means that any suitably qualified person; from any part of the world, can be considered for immigration to Canada entirely on his own merit, without regard to his race, colour, national origin or the country from which he comes. This is a subtantial advance over the former Regulations in that the selection of immigrants, insofar as selection on the basis of skills is concerned, will be done without discrimination of any kind.

While the regulations still contained a certain disadvantage for Canadians whose relatives lived outside the "favored areas" as far as "sponsored" immigrants were concerned the new policy was, nevertheless, a significant step toward the liberalization of Canada's immigration laws and the removal of racial discrimination.


No purpose would be served (from the point of view of this report) by going into the complex details of all the legislation and orders-in-council pertaining to immigration which have been enacted over the years, prior to 1962. However, it is necessary to say that during this whole period the Canadian government argued that there was really no discrimination and that they were selecting immigrants who were, in terms of similar culture

^{1. &}quot;Favored areas" were listed as Europe, Turkey, Israel, Lebanon, Egypt or the Americas, therefore a Canadian citizen or resident whose relatives (other than his immediate family) lived in Asia, Africa or the Indies, etc..could not sponsor them unless they could meet the requirements of skill, occupation and education on their own merit.



and of political philosophy, adaptable to Canadian life. They firmly contended that unrestrained immigration from dissimilar countries might cause fundamental changes to the character of Canada, which they felt the Canadian public did not wish.

This concern (as enunciated by politicians of the day and also by government officials in the Immigration Department) for "maintaining the cultural composition of the country" nevertheless was unquestionably a 'closeddoor to non-whites. One former Minister of Immigration told this writer that he was convinced that whenever any of our Canadian governments considered the meaning of *maintaining the cultural composition* they were converned with only one overriding factor, namely the need to refuse entry as a general rule to all non-whites (particularly Asiatics) with exceptions being made only in special, individual cases for certain limited categories. Department's official policy files give ample substantiation for this point of view and one is forced to conclude that the departmental officials generally were convinced that this was a good policy and one that the majority of Canadians favored. Undoubtedly, the politicians were far more concerned with this 'white' aspect of immigration policy than with any other so-called 'ethnic' balance. Certainly, the question of maintaining any "English-French" ratio (according to the former Ministers and other politicians



consulted by this writer) was simply just not a matter of public political concern.

It is necessary to point out, too, that it was not until Order-in-Council P.C. 4186 of September 16, 1948 that we find a statutory reference to any provision for the 'citizens of France'. This order brought such citizens within the same category as certain British subjects and United States citizens with respect to admission to Canada. The British and American immigrants had hitherto enjoyed special or preferential treatment; from 1948 on, in legislation, in any event, the French were to receive the same considerations.

On the surface, this relatively recent order-incouncil would seem to indicate that there had been discrimination toward immigrants from France, the 'motherland' of one of the two 'founding groups'. Was this in
fact true? The answer to this must await a full discussion
of all the factors involved and this is more appropriatedly
undertaken in later sections of this report.

As has been outlined briefly above, in general terms, the trend to making Canada's legislation more liberal has been very gradual. It really began in the immediate post—World War II period. A more detailed examination of policy during the two decades after 1945 also reveals that, while



the flexibility of Canada's policy was increased by its broadened terms of admissibility, government officials nevertheless became more aware of the need for selectivity from economic (and other) points of view.

The next section will attempt to analyse more specifically the changes which took place and to consider this policy's implications for the French and English ethnic groups in Canada.




B. Post-World War II Policy

As has been indicated, prior to World War II the federal government immigration policy had been, at best, merely a short-term response to external factors.

With the exception of one or two periods (e.g. Sifton's plan to develop the west), Canada's was never an 'aggressive', positive policy. It had consisted rather of passively accepting such numbers of the white race as wished to migrate to her shores—provided they met the Immigration Act's qualifications for entry. Non-white immigration (particularly Oriental) was, without question, a different matter; this is treated separately, very briefly, elsewhere in this study.

Scholarly critics have argued that Canada's policy has always been restrictive and that the Immigration Department has traditionally been more concerned with exclusion and with the categories of people to be refused admission than it has been with bringing people in. Such charges are substantiated, to a certain degree, by reading the relevant sections of the Immigration Regulations over the years. During the 1930's, when the country was undergoing its share of the world depression, there were few voices to be heard anywhere objecting to such a 'closed door' policy -- unless, of course, one considers those who were themselves refused admission.

^{1.} Note -- See, among others: Corbett, David C. Canada s Immigration Policy (Univ. of Toronto Press, 1957)



When hostilities ceased in 1945, however, with the resultant massive dislocation of peoples throughout the world, questions of emigration and immigration assumed grave importance for all the nations concerned. What was Canada's policy?

That question might well be asked as might another: Why, in the light of those post-war circumstances around the globe, was not a federal policy of some vision and with long-term objectives formulated, to meet the needs of the international scene as well as our own? The areas of underdevelopment, food scarcity and over-population (to say nothing of millions of war displaced and refugees) stood in contrast to the highly industrialized, wealthy countries enjoying an abundance of food. In fact, surpluses so large as to cause grave economic problems seemed paradoxical, to say the least.

Canada's position placed her in the happy category of a nation of great wealth and virtually unlimited potential, holding vast areas of empty space for a population of a mere 12 million. Those who were conscious of the human factor in the equation of these world migratory problems felt Canada was in an excellent position to help redress the grave imbalance by embarking upon an immigration policy which would be positive in every way.

The most immediate aspect of the international migration problem was to meet the needs of the refugees and displaced persons. Despite a professed adherance to the words



of the United Nations Charter proclaiming, "all men brothers regardless of race, nationality or creed," the Canadian government's response to this specific question of Displaced Persons left much to be desired. (See details as outlined in this writer's unpublished thesis.)

There were, no doubt, many reasons for the slow reaction on Canada's part; certainly the major factor was lack of a clear, long-term immigration policy. As in so many instances in the Canadian government system, immediate day-to-day matters of political expediency took precedence.

Statesmanship should concern itself with a nation s future as well as its present but when statesmen are lacking, and purely partisan politicians are at the helm, the prospects are dimindeed.

The discussions which took place in Parliament during the years immediately following the end of the war reveal the paucity of government concern for the plight of the displaced. It took nearly two years of agitation in the House and press before the Government would enunciate its intentions.

The official policy, as declared by Prime Minister W. L. Mackenzie King, in a statement to the House of Commons on May 1, 1947 soon became well-known as the "immigration-in-keeping-with-absorptive-capacity policy and was constantly quoted by

^{1.} Walmsley, N.E. - Canada's Response to the International Problem of Displaced Persons 1947-51 (unpublished thesis, McGill Univ.; 1954)



the then Minister of Immigration whenever critics pressed for an increased rate of flow. Excerpts quoted here reveal clearly the attitude of the Government at that time and for many subsequent years. Mr. King was convinced that he spoke for the majority of the Canadian people when he declared:

The policy of the government is to foster the growth of the population of Canada by the encouragement of immigration. The government will seek by legislation, regulation, and vigorous administration, to ensure the careful selection and permanent settlement of such numbers of immigrants as can advantageously be absorbed in our national economy...

...With regard to the selection of immigrants, much has been said about discrimination. I wish to make it quite clear that Canada is perfectly within her rights in selecting the persons whom we regard as desirable future citizens. It is not a "fundamental human right" of an alien to enter Canada. It is a privilege. It is a matter of domestic policy. Immigration is subject to the control of the parliament of Canada. This does not mean, however, that we should not seek to remove from our legislation discrimination which appears to be objectionable.

... There will, I am sure, be general agreement with the view that the people of Canada do not wish, as a result of mass immigration, to make a fundamental alteration in the character of our population. Large scale immigration from the Orient would change the fundamental composition of the Canadian population. Any considerable oriental immigration would, moreover, be certain to give rise to social and economic problems of a character that might lead to serious difficulties in the field of international relations. The government, therefore, has no thought of making any change in immigration regulations which would have consequences of that kind.

I wish to state quite definitely, that apart from the repeal of the Chinese Immigration Act and the revocation of order in council P.C. 1378 of June 17, 1931 regarding naturalization, the government has no intention of




removing the existing regulations respecting Asiatic immigration unless and until alternative measures of effective control have been worked out. Canada recognizes the right of all other countries to control the entry or non-entry of persons seeking to become permanent residents. We claim precisely the same right for our country.

While the Prime Minister considered that he was articulating the views of the Canadian people as a whole, the fact was that he and his government were lagging behind public sentiment in this regard. Certainly the attitude of the English-speaking Canadians was that Canada needed immigrants and, while she particularly welcomed the strong and the skilled, there was nevertheless a sizeable body of opinion which urged the government to take action to bring in its share of the displaced war refugees including the 'hardcore' cases or chronically ill who were desperately in need of medical care and rehabilitation.

Even most of the French Canadians, who had traditionally objected to immigration because they felt it worked to their disadvantage vis-a-vis the French-English ratio, were influenced by the humanitarian pleas of the church on behalf of the war displaced. While they did not really exert pressure to bring people in, still, they refrained from making any strong objections toward immigration of this type of unfortunate individual. However, some Quebec members in the House of Commons did claim that international humanitarianism had no place in the determination of immigration policy!

^{1.} Rt. Hon. W. L. Mackenzie King, House of Commons Debates, May 2, 1947, pp. 2644-47.




Of course, economically speaking, the time was ripe for immigration and labour was needed for industrial expansion; the low birth rates of the depression had created a shortage of persons in the appropriate age groups who normally would have been entering the labour market, and the increasing expansion of the post-war world held out great promise of Canadian capacity to sustain a much larger population.

Prior to the end of World War II there is no evidence that any careful evaluation of Canada's labour needs or of expert selection was ever truly undertaken. But in 1950, after the broadened terms of the 'admissible classes' came into effect, the practice of consulting with Department of Labour officials began, and officials developed something which resembled a planned immigration policy. True, it was on an annual basis, but it had vague, long-term goals nevertheless.

However, this came about only after much influence had been brought to bear upon the Canadian government by both national and international public opinion in all its forms. Details cannot be discussed in this study, but in the period 1945-50 there was an unprecedented change of attitude and approach to the subject of immigration by the Canadian public and government alike. During 1947 to 1951 Canada did embark upon a policy new in the field of Canadian immigration. This

^{1.} As referred to earlier, a full discussion of this may be found in Canada's Response to the International Problem of Displaced Persons 1947-51 by this writer.




policy was, however, concerned with the Displaced Persons category of immigrant only; in fact it was a small part of the much larger, internationally-attempted solution to a problem of global extent. Conflicting emotions of humanitarianism and national self-interest did, indeed, bring about a complex situation; while Canada had the opportunity to serve both causes, she was slow in taking any definite action.

When she finally did, a total of 157,687 displaced persons were brought to Canada between the years 1947-51. The machinery set up in conjunction with the International Refugee Organization by the Department of Immigration (after the famous 1947 policy speech of Prime Minister Mackenzie Kingl), included sending immigration officers abroad while the Immigration Branch and Department of Labour officials 'determined' the numbers (and types) which could be 'absorbed' into the Canadian economy.

At no time did the Canadian government see fit to enunciate a clearly defined long-term policy; they worked on a more or less day-to-day basis. This made the overall task of IRO difficult, caused unnecessary emotional strain to the D.P.'s and other immigrants involved, and spelled outright frustration for all concerned. It also meant that Canada lost the opportunity to obtain a really high quality immigrant (in terms of


^{1.} Order-in-Council PC 1734 (May 1, 1947), tabled during this speech, extended terms of admissibility of relatives, and Order-in-Council PC 2180 dated June 6, 1947 granted authority for the immediate admission to Canada of 5000 individuals from Displaced Persons camps in Europe. Subsequent orders-in-council continued to raise the numbers for the duration of the D.P. program.



educational and professional skills). Short term needs were really defined in terms of farmers, domestics and industrial workers -- mostly of the labouring category -- and included, of course, wives and dependants. The professional and highly skilled were usually snapped up by such countries as Australia, who had made a point of establishing a definite, long-term immigration policy and who had no hesitation in stating that they welcomed immigration in every sense of the word.

Nevertheless, by the end of the *D.P.* program, December 1951 the Canadian government had gradually shifted from its first restrictive policy, followed by the years of reluctance to formulate anything definite, to the point where it finally seemed to realize that Canada needed people and that it was "in the immigration business", like it or not. That they were not wholehearedly enthusiastic was evident by the lack of any clearly defined objectives. The government seemed to be saying, "We admit that the country needs more immigrants but...". At no time did they clearly enunciate what should be aimed at as the long-term objective, how many immigrants should be admitted annually, whether they should be skilled or unskilled, sponsored or unsponsored, white or non-white, whether from particular countries or from all, and by what selection methods.

The Minister of Immigration was fond of quoting Mr. King and saying "immigration should not alter the fundamental character of the population". This was sufficiently vague as to be acceptable (in the government's eyes at least) to everyone.




In a speech at the time of proposed new regulations in 1950 the Minister of Immigration (Mr. Harris) claimed:

(I have been)...most attentive to the opinions voiced in regard to immigration, in parliament, in the press, in statements of leaders of public opinion and in day-to-day conversation with ordinary citizens. I have also given careful consideration to an impressive number of representations from organizations speaking on behalf of capital, labour, religious and professional bodies, racial minorities and several other groups...It is significant that no one has questioned the soundness of the principles of the immigration policy pursued by the government since 1947. Today, three years after it was formulated, and in spite of changing circumstances at home and abroad, the principles of the policy announced by the former Prime Minister remain unchallenged and. I believe, command the confidence of the Canadian population...Immigration must not have the effect of altering the fundamental character of the population...

Here the minister was ignoring, of course, substantial criticism from numerous quarters which charged inaction and government incompetence with regard to immigration. However, his reference was to the fact that the government considered its policy of maintaining *ethnic balance* to meet with public approval.

In actual fact, however, his definition of "ethnic balance" (or the idea of 'fundamental character of the population', as he termed it) really meant that immigrants from northern and perhaps central and eastern Europe were suitable but non-whites, either Asiatic or colored, were not.

In the same speech the Minister went on to say, in connection with the exercise of his virtually unlimited power of decision or 'ministerial descretion' over admissibility, that a Departmental Committee had been set up to advise him.




This committee will keep in close touch with conditions throughout Canada as regards needs and opportunities for immigrants, by seeking the assistance of specialists from Departments of the federal and provincial governments, representatives of national and provincial organizations, professional associations, labour unions, manufacturers' associations, representatives of educational institutions, etc.

The committee to which the Minister referred represented a promising trend in government policy which warrants our consideration. The Departmental Advisory Committee on Immigration (or D.A.C.I. as it was referred to in the Department) was established on authorization of a Cabinet directive of June 27, 1950, to assis and advise the Minister in the administration of the Immigration Act and Regulations. It was composed of senior officers of the Immigration Branch Headquarters under the charimanship of the Deputy Minister. The committee was authorized:

to seek the advice and assistance of specialists from departments of the federal and provincial governments, representation of national and provincial organizations, professional associations, labour unions, manufacturers associations, educational institutions and of such other persons or organized bodies from whom it may deem it expedient to seek advice...

On the face of this one would conclude that, at long last, the government appeared to be making an honest attempt to formulate a sound policy based on the considered opinion of all important sectors of society. This sounded fine in theory — What happened in practice?



The committee met periodically and, for a while, also held annual meetings with representatives of labour, business and other organizations as well as those of other federal departments and provincial governments.

It is not clear why the committee ceased holding its meetings but the minutes indicate that the last one was held September 24, 1958. At this time pressures seem to have been mounting, according to the Department of Labour officials who claimed that the public (and particularly organized labour) were demanding a 'cut-off' of immigration due to a fear that the uncertain international and domestic economic conditions of 1958 would result in recession.

Certainly the minutes of this last meeting reflect a sharp divergence of views between the officials of the Department of Labour and the Immigration Branch as to the need for immigration. Labour Department officials stressed the need for extreme caution, whereas Immigration officials wished to continue the program, even if on a reduced scale.

The voluminous minutes of the meetings reflect lengthy discussions on practically every phase of immigration policy and its implications for the country. In reading these accounts of discussions, one finds ample evidence of a substantial body of support throughout the country for immigration, particularly for skilled workers and professional persons. Depending on the varying needs in the provinces, the demand for agricultrual workers, labourers and domestics fluctuated from time to time and place to place.



The question of government policy with regard to 'ethnic balance' came up several times but again the government, in most cases, considered this to mean the need (in their view) to discourage all non-white immigration, believing this to be the wish of the majority of Canadians.

In a few instances, the committee discussed this matter in relation to all ethnic origins. One example, taken from the minutes of a meeting of the D.A.C.I. at which officials of the government of Ontario were present, is rather pertinent. The Ontario Director asked why immigration in the period 1947 to 1952 did not correspond with the ethnic ratio of the resident population of his province. He said he was asking for an explanation of this, since one of the consistently announced "tenets of Canadian Immigration policy is that immigration will not change the fundamental character of the Canadian population".

The chairman did not deny or affirm that this was official policy but stated that "the international situation after the war resulted in the admission to Canada of a preponderance of refugees which threw out the balance of ethnic origin from an immigration standpoint." He mentioned also that a demand for labour in Canada did not permit selection abroad on a strict ratio thesis, according to the ethnic origin of the resident population in Canada. For example, he said, it is not possible to get farm-worker immigrants from the United Kingdom in any quantity; therefore the Immigration Branch must seek other ethnic groups to fill this need.



Other ethnic groups, in this case, never seemed to carry the connotation of including Asiatics or *colored* immigrants but there was no doubt in the minds of all government officials that, when they spoke of Mackenzie King's policy of not altering the fundamental nature of Canada's population, most definitely they meant restricting non-white immigration. This is substantiated also by the D.A.C.I. committee minutes (July 7, 1950) which re-affirmed "the present policy of not facilitating the admission of colored or partly-colored immigrants other than admissible under paragraph 1 of P.C. 2856". Of course, every once in awhile one or two would be permitted entry at the minister's discretion. As the committee minutes put it, "That policy, however, is not one of absolute exclusion and allows for the judicious consideration of individual cases on merit ... " And again,..."as a matter of policy it is not desirable to facilitate the admission of such families," (referring to Asiatic race). At the next meeting July 12, 1950 the chairman further indicated that the policy of the department of Citizenship and Immigration definitely remained "not to facilitate the admission of colored immigrants."

^{1.} Hon. J. W. Pickersgill, former Minister of Immigration emphatically confirmed this in a personal interview (February 22, 1965) with this researcher. He claimed that he personally had drafted the Mackenzie King speech and that this was the clear understanding of all concerned. At no time was it ever intended, that "not altering the fundamental nature of Canada's population" should mean the maintenance of some sort of English-French ratio. Both he and Mackenzie King meant a balance in the sense of Oriental vs Non-Oriental and as far as French-speaking immigration was concerned, the Quebec government was just not interested nor did Frenchmen in France wish to emigrate. He added that the Honorable Louis St. Laurent was well aware of these facts and was under no illusion on this score.



Individual cases were indeed often discussed during these committee meetings and exceptions made, regarding admissions of Jews, Germans and Russians, etc., provided they could prove that substantial amounts of money were ready to be transferred or were available to the immigrant.

The External Affairs representative at the September 15, 1951 meeting stated that it was "becoming increasingly difficult to defend Canadian policy in respect of certain racial groups at international discussions". Referring to the situation in the British West Indies he said that, while he could not state categorically that this was having adverse effects on trade relations, still "there are a sufficient number of danger signals flying to warrant a re-examination of the existing policy and its likely effects."

He didn't advocate a radical shift because as he said,
"Amongst thinking leaders it is recognized that unrestricted
immigration such as exists in the U.S. from Puerto Rico and
even into England from the Colonial Empire would not be desirable," but " a tolerant immigration policy which would permit
the entry of a restricted number of persons of British Carribbean birth irrespective of their racial origin is essential."

In a *background brief* provided to committee members at the September 27, 1951 meeting it is clearly stated that "...It has long been the policy of the Department to restrict




the admission to Canada of colored or partly-colored persons. This policy is based on unfavorable experience with respect to negro settlements such as we have in Halifax, the generally depressed circumstances of the negro in Canada and an understanding that the Canadian public is not willing to accept any significant group of negro immigrants".

The Committee showed their reluctance to come to grips with the question by deciding that "rejections (where possible) would be based on occupational grounds...(which) ...would be a much easier policy to uphold".

At the October 1, 1951 meeting, it was decided that restrictions re colored immigrants should be relaxed and more adm issions allowed "providing (sic) the number of persons landed does not contribute to a change in the fundamental character of the Canadian population." While the question of 'colored' immigration may be felt to be irrelevant to this particular study, the writer considers it essential to establish the fact that the concern of Canadian officials with the oft-quoted "balance of ethnic origins" was not interpreted as a French-English ratio. Rather, it was considered for decades as pertaining to the 'white versus colored races'.

Given the above situation, what then was the federal government's attitude and that of departmental officials to any possible 'French-English' balance where immigration was concerned?



While the answer to this is more appropriately provided in Chapter VI after a discussion of the factors influencing policy, it is necessary to say at this point that from 1945 onward the Department's policy showed its increasing concern with attempting to obtain French-speaking immigrants.

However, we must emphasize that prior to the Second World War, as has already been indicated, immigration policy during all but a few exceptional periods (such as the Sifton era and its aftermath) was more restrictive than permissive. Certainly between the two world wars it never reached the stage of positive, determined action to recruit large numbers of individuals for the purpose of populating Canada, much less a determined policy to change the ethnic content of that population either one way or the other. Immigration policy was just not designed for that purpose, as is quite plain from the lack of either staff or other administrative machinery to implement policy.

But with the broadening of the admissibility regualtions in 1950 a new spirit became evident in the department and the beginning of what might be termed the modern Canadian immigration program became discernible. These changes came about first because of the international refugee situation and the pressures brought to bear upon the government to act (as described briefly above). Obviously, this caused a natural development of the department, stemming from the new machinery which had to be put in motion for the 'Displaced Persons' program in conjunction with



I.R.O. Secondly and concurrently (and far more important in the long run) was the need for the government, and therefore the department, to respond to the tremendous demands for workers of all kinds (skilled and unskilled) as the post-war boom and Canada's industrial expansion got underway.

It is important at this juncture to bear in mind just who was admissible according to the Immigration Act. As mentioned above, when the government did finally respond to public pressure and admit certain numbers of refugees and D.P.*, it did so by the use of special orders-in-council because there was no provision for them to enter under the Act. Prior to June 9, 1950 the Immigration Act and Regulations allowed admission (after consideration of those definitely excluded under its terms) only to the preferred classes of British, French, citizens of the United States, Ireland, Australia, New Zealand, and South Africa. (It will be recalled that citizens of France had been brought into the same category as British and United States citizens by Order-in-Council PC 4186 of September 16, 1948.)

However, with the broadening of the admissibility classes by Order-in-Council PC 2856 of June 9, 1950 admission now became possible for:

...any immigrant who satisfies the Minister that he is a suitable immigrant, having regard to the climatic, social, educational, industrial, labour or other conditions or requirements of Canada; and that he is not undesirable owing to the probable inability to become readily adapted and integrated into the life of a Canadian community and to assume the duties of Canadian citizenship within a reasonable time after his entry.

^{1.} Provided also that they were 'white', as discussed in previous section.



With the enactment of this Order-in-Council PC 2856, laxity of legislation reached its peak. In view of this, it was no longer even necessary to issue special orders-in-council or quotas for admissions of D.P.'s or immigrants of any kind because by one of its clauses (Sec. 4) entry was allowed to any "person who satisfies the Minister, whose decision shall be final ..." This surely gave the Minister unlimited powers (as referred to earlier). This was indeed a flexible policy, but what of the need for some stability also? Obviously a tap that can be turned on so easily may be turned off with equal ease. The over-riding factor here was that now, for the first time in decades, the Canadian government was "in the immigration business." Like everything Canadian, however, cautionary characteristics were ever present. A number of prominent menbers in the House of Commons were consistently deriding the government for its lack of drive. As one Member stated: "The minister said that the aim of the immigration branch of the department is to promote an increase in the population of Canada -- If that is the aim, it seems to me that the government has been maddeningly slow in carrying it out."1

While on the one hand, the policy now had the opportunity to be 'positive' it could quickly become negative. It was still the 'on-and-off-tap' system. Obviously, too, the manner of the policy's implementation would depend on the staff and the finances

^{1.} Mr. Thatcher House of Commons Debates (rev.) April 21, 1950 p. 1760.



available. Unfortunately for those who firmly believed that Canada's development and future depended on a large population, this was still by no means a long-term immigration policy.

Officials in the department consistently drew attention to the need for a program which could be adapted to periods of economic expansion or of possible temporary contraction.

The D.A.C.I. minutes for this period reveal that the Immigration Branch complained bitterly that policy "cannot be planned on a start-and-stop basis, as it takes a long time to build up a flow of immigrants once it has been curtailed...Whenever a stoppage occurs, an impression is left in the mind of potential immigrants that Canada is not particularly interested..." During these years (and up to 1956 at least) prospective immigrants had usually been refused permission to come forward, simply because they did not possess a 'listed' trade or occupation (i.e. one that was shown on the occupational list as being in demand in Canada), not withstanding the fact that the individual may have been skilled and otherwise acceptable. This obviously meant that Canada lost a generally acceptable type, capable of contributing to the greater development of the country.

A difference of opinion existed during most of this time between officials of the Immigration Department and those of the Labour Department. The Labour Department, on the whole, tended to look upon immigration as a source of manpower that could be tapped to fill specific labour shortages in Canada as



they sporadically occurred in various areas of employment.

Senior officials of the Immigration branch, however, wished it to be much more or (as one official put it) "...a means of fostering the growth of the population by ensuring that the largest number of desirable immigrants who can be advantageously absorbed in the national economy, can come to Canada for permanent settlement."

Judging from the correspondence on other files of the Immigration Branch, there was a great deal of animosity and ill-feeling between the two departments over policy control of the placement of immigrants for permanent settlement—The Labour Department considered that it was responsible for all placements, whereas the Immigration Department felt strongly that migration movements from abroad for permanent settlement were the responsibility of their department.


There is ample evidence on the D.A.C.I. minutes of this friction between Department of Labour (especially National Employment Service) and the Department of Citizenship and Immigration (particularly the Settlement officers); each jealously guarded its operations, with both Deputy Ministers viewing for primacy of authority. In the minutes (June 12, 1951) the chairman attempted to make clear that control over the number of immigrants to be admitted was not a matter for N.E.S. but solely for the Department of Citizenship and Immigration. At many



other meetings disagreements between these two departments were quite common and although from time to time attempts were made to secure better cooperation, nevertheless in the areas where conflicts arose in the work with immigrants involving both departments, it was obvious that 'bad feeling' existed to such an extent (especially between deputy ministers concerned) that animosity was never far below the surface and all too often erupted with a good deal of emotion to the detriment of everybody concerned.

Canada continued to find herself in increasingly short supply of skilled labour and the situation had become quite acute during the Korean War. The government's policy was not too clearly defined and members of the House of Commons tried rather unsuccessfully to get the Minister to clarify its aims, objectives and practices. On the whole, the debates reveal no major national goals and seem to reflect a general confusion in the thinking of the government as far as immigration was concerned. The general tone of criticism levelled at the government was "too little and too late". Some claimed that because the government was so slow to act they had lost the 'cream of the crop' to Australia, New Zealand and the United States and that it was no wonder they were disorganized -- they had "had five ministers in the last five years". Mr. Drew, who had launched

^{1.} Mr. White, House of Commons Debates (revised), February 9, 1951 p. 241.




his own program while premier of Ontario, accused the government of setting a policy (of sorts) but not backing it up with the machinery to make it effective. This, he argued, indicated a lack of "any real belief in immigration to this country at this particular time".

The federal government had instituted, the previous December, an assisted air passage scheme for immigrants to travel via T.CA. and a type of assisted passage loan scheme was in effect but, as the Minister announced later to the House, it "was suspended on October 11, 1951 because the total revolving fund had been committed". It was later re-instated.

In terms of the new Bill introduced in the House,1952 was a significant year, but surprisingly little debate took place. The Minister took the position that it was merely a revision and consolidation and that it introduced no new policy. He discouraged debate by the members at the time, on the understanding that an opportunity would be provided during discussion of the estimates. However, estimates were not brought in until the last day of the session and any substantial debate was therefore impossible.

Some of the western M.P.'s in Parliament urged the government to increase immigration, while most of the French M.P.'s were still fearful"that more immigration would add to unemployment."


^{1.} Mr. Drew, House of Commons Debates (revised), November 25, 1951 p. 1306



In 1953 it was evident from the figures tabled by the Minister that British immigration had risen in 1952 over the previous year as a result, no doubt, of all the criticism levelled earlier at the government. But Mr. Fulton argued that this apparent increase was really an illusory one for it consisted of dependents and not heads of families. In reality it was claimed that in proportion to the ethnic balance of the population, the British immigration was actually falling off, and the goverment was criticized during the debates for doing nothing to counteract the trend. The Minister claimed that the policy of the government was "to stimulate Canadian growth and Canadian development" but admitted that the total figure for 1952 was down, over that of the previous year, because of employment circumstances and because the 'absorptive capacity' had not been as high in Canada as it had been the previous year. He also pointed out that in 1951 the government had taken advantage of the shipping made available by the closing of the International Refugee Organization's operation in the final months of that year. This had caused an unusually heavy intake of immigrants at that time.

The Minister said he regretted that more immigrants were not coming in from France but that "France itself is a country of immigration and is not anxious to encourage emigration.

However, that proportion of our population representing the




Latin races was well represented." (French, Italians and Belgians had totalled 27,000.)

Again, Mr. Thatcher argued that Canada needed people and he quoted the head of one of the largest trade unions, Mr. C.H. Millard, "Canada in the next ten years should admit about 2% of its present population annually in immigration." (This would be about 280,000 to 300,000 yearly.)

Members of the House severely criticized the Minister of Immigration during the supply debate of 1954, accusing him of trying to avoid critical debate of his department by leaving the estimates as late as possible before introducing them in the House. Mr. Fulton argued, "...the fact is that we have not had an adequate or full discussion of this Department since 1950, and that for the three years since then until the present time the department has in fact been discussed for approximately only three days and one hour." He claimed the reason was that the Immigration Branch policy (or lack of policy) had been too harshly criticized and therefore Mr. Harris feared any debate on it.

^{1.} Hon. W. A. Harris, House of Commons Debates (revised), April 23, 1953, p. 4327

^{2.} Mr. Fulton, House of Commons Debates (revised), June 26, 1954, p. 6788



In 1955, sharply worded criticism was being directed at the government. Unemployment had begun to climb noticeably due, it was argued, to the government's policy which had resulted in bringing into the country a large proportion of single, working men rather than family units. In particular, there were charges from the French M.P.'s that immigration was swelling the ranks of the unemployed.

The economic effects of policy were not the only aspects being questioned. The administration came under fire by a leading professional society when a sub-committee of the Canadian Bar Association charged "shocking procedural practices at its offices all over the world." The sub-committee had been at work for two and one-half years and claimed it had "literally pounds" of evidence to back up its charges. Nevertheless at the convention of the Bar Association it requested permission to continue its investigation for another year, because the subject was so vast and in need of such study.

The opposition in Parliament, on the basis of the Bar Association Reports, demanded a Royal Commission to investigate the whole question of immigration policy, legislation and administration, but the Government stated it had no intention of granting the demand and formally refused the request. A motion of censure was then introduced by the member for Kamloops and heavy criticism of the Department took place during the ensuing debate.



The critics of federal immigration policy, who had since 1950 bewailed their lack of opportunity to air their grievances on the floor of the House, seized the opportunity to express their views when Mr. Fulton on February 15 moved his resolution on the motion to go into committee of Supply. Throughout the two preceding years criticism had been getting more harsh and time for debate had been intentionally or otherwise limited.

Mr. Harris had been shifted to the portfolio of Finance and Mr. Pickersgill had become Minister of Citizenship and Immigration.

The opposition's motion of censure was based on the government's alleged:

(a) lack of clarity, consistency and co-ordination between immigration policies and other government policies and between the various departments responsible for administering the policy.

(b) neglect of British immigration.

(c) refusal to grant right of appeal to Canadian citizens overrefusal of admission of relatives.

This was the signal for all members to launch into a general attack on government policy repeating all the various criticisms levelled to date, among them the charges that the traditional ethnic balance was not being maintained.

One member charged that "a definite change of policy occurred in the year 1949 and that change of policy seems to have carried on through the years that followed." He went on

^{1.} Mr. G. Churchill, House of Commonse Debates (revised), February 17, 1955, p. 1272.



to say that this had been directed at lowering the percentage of British immigrants in the total immigration flow.

A request was made for "a permanent advisory council of federal and provincial government officials but also representatives of labour, management, farmers and social service organizations who are interested in immigrants." It was argued that this committee should also direct social research in the whole field of immigration so that the government would have some scientific basis for policy.


Government policy was also criticized for not recognizing the special needs of the immigrants where education was concerned and for other aspects of social neglect. The need for the province of Quebec, particularly, to be more receptive to immigrants was stressed. Even one of the French-Canadian members was moved to apologize for his province:

Perhaps I should apologize because...most of the provinces have come to some arrangement with the federal government to help and to improve the conditions of immigrants coming to this country, but I regret to say that the province in which I live and of which I am very proud has not seen fit to enter into an agreement with the federal government to try to increase the number of immigrants of French descent arriving in Canada.

^{1.} Mr. Noseworthy, House of Commonse Debates (revised), February 15, 1955, p. 1171

February 15, 1955, p. 1171

2. Mr. Maltais, House of Commons Debates (revised), February 15, 1955, p. 1187



Government policy was defended by the Minister (and former Minister) and the motion of censure negatived by a division of 62 to 111 but the criticism, together with that at the time of the departmental estimates debate served, no doubt, to acquaint the government with the fact that public approval of their policy left much to be desired.

In the early spring of 1956, the Deputy Minister of Immigration took a trip abroad to all immigration offices to discuss ways and means to improving procedures with a view to increasing the flow of immigrants to Canada. He also talked with government officials of the various European countries and, upon his return, reported the results to the April 13 meeting of the Departmental Advisory Committee on Immigration. In particular, he pointed out that there would be increased difficulty in obtaining immigrants from the United Kingdom and France because the skilled workers which Canada wished to recruit were the very ones most needed by these countries themselves. The Chairman of the Committee announced that the Immigration Branch planned to open two new offices in France in outlying districts but they would have to await approval of External Affairs and the French Government. The Branch was also anxious, he said, to take advantage of the desire of French North Africans to

^{1.} It is interesting to note that this was April 1956, and the offices were not opened until 1965, chiefly because of the attitude of the French Government towards emigration.



migrate but again, because of the attitude of the French Government, this movement could not amount to much until Algerian independence was granted and then as will be explained in Chapter V, other factors entered into the situation.

The chairman also explained that the employment situation overseas was referred to as "tight" and, though immigrants were not easily recruited, the demands for skilled and unskilled in Canada had never been greater. Even the Department of Labour and the Labour Unions urged more immigration. For example, at the meeting of the D.A.C.I. October 19, 1956, the National Employment Service representative conceded that "the emphasis is now placed on finding workers for employers instead of finding jobs for the unemployed." Another representative of the Department of Labour stated, "We should also recruit as many technical and professional immigrants as possible." At the same meeting, the chairman argued, "We should bring 300,000 to Canada in 1957 if it were possible to recruit them." Everyone agreed that every effort should be made to increase the flow of immigrants to the level desired.

This planning brought results, and 1957 saw the heaviest influx of immigrants since 1913 -- partly due to the Suez and Hungarian situations by primarily to more effective recruiting by overseas staff.



Criticism continued to be heard in Parliament but it was not quite as sharp as the previous year. Following the Hungarian Revolution, the government was urged to bring some of these refugees to Canada. (Mr. Drew had proposed a motion of censure at the special session in November 1956 after which the government had instituted a policy by which a considerable number were admitted to Canada.)

Certainly 1956 had brought some policy changes in the application of the Assisted Passage scheme and modifications of the loan scheme. These had resulted in the increased total immigration but particularly in a rise in the number of admissions of British immigrants (although the simplified procedures put into effect covered immigrants from the United Kingdom and France equally).

The question of 'ethnic balance' did not enter into any of the planning or policy discussions. The necessity for workers was the determining factor. Aggressive recruiting and increased efforts were the order of the day in all European offices -- France included -- although the French government did all it could to discourage emigration (see Chapter V).

But again the traditionally cautious nature of Canadian officials began to take effect. The fear of criticism if too many immigrants arrived, especially in the fall and winter, led the Branch to severely curtail the immigration flow that had



just begun to become a flood. Those who couldn't be processed before July 31 were asked to defer migration until the following year.

The dangers of curtailment were pointed out, however, as the Chairman of the D.A.C.I. warned that postponement of the opportunity for migration would inevitably result in the immigrants choosing to go to Australia, Rhodesia and other countries only too eager to take them.

Also, the committee minutes state that, "If our programming had these continual ups and downs, people planning to come to Canada would get disgusted ... the best type of immigrant did not decide to emigrate overnight, but considered it for a long period of time ... if the prospective immigrant saw many fluctuations in Canada's immigration program, then he would go elsewhere." The Immigration Branch felt that, in spite of worsening economic conditions in Canada, migrants were necessary but hard promotional work would be needed to get them.

Those who advocated caution, however, won out. The Cabinet was advised to approve a restrictive program. They deferred their decision, directing that the matter be reviewed again in April 1958. The Chairman reminded the April meeting of the D.A.C.I. that a decision must be made on the 1958 program without further delay. A tremendous back-log of "close-relative sponsored" cases existed (e.g. Italy, 60,000 and Greece, 9000), and pressures



were mounting on the Immigration Branch for the admission of various ethnic groups, refugees, and so forth. The chairman felt that if an announcement were not made soon, it would be taken as a sign of lack of confidence in Canadian economic prospects and would result in a serious decrease in migration interest, which it would take years to rebuild.

At this meeting most everyone, including the representative of Trade and Commerce (who at the previous meeting had argued against a decrease), now felt it was necessary to proceed on a cautious basis.

At the September 24, 1958 meeting¹ emphasis was placed on the need to give instructions which would encourage a spirit of optimism in the overseas staff. This optimism could, in turn, be imparted to prospective immigrants upon whom the restrictive policies were having a discouraging effect.

This particular meeting seems to have been the last of the D.A.C.I. but a complete explanation for its discontinuance 1. is lacking. Although the D.A.C.I., as such, ceased to function in September 1958, when the emphasis was taken off a positive immigration program, various other staff committees have since functioned on a lesser scale and performed a similar role of advisory body to the Director. One of these, called the "Management Committee", consisted of the Director, Executive Assistant and the senior chiefs of Operations, Settlement and Administration. This met intermittently from July 1959 to 1963 and then in 1965 a more formalized type of Policy Committee began meeting fairly regularly. Minutes are not kept, but a record of any decisions taken is maintained by the Executive Assistant to the Assistant Deputy Minister. (These files reveal no major changes in policy, but indicate an intensification of efforts to recruit skilled immigrants for all areas of Canada.)



However, the various representatives (particularly the Department of Labour official) drew attention to the "hundreds of letters addressed to the Prime Minister or the Department of Labour complaining about displacement of Canadians by the new immigrants." Caution was advised, despite the expressed statement of the Immigration Branch officials that they preferred an aggressive approach and deplored the pessimism which seemed to prevail.

The pressures to reduce the immigration program in 1958, causing the Branch to curtail its operations, had the disastrous effect of reducing staff just at a time when young university people were being recruited and trained for careers in a much re-organized and rejuvenated department. This influx of 'new blood' and intelligence as well as an emphasis on increased efficiency had augured well for an enlightened approach to the whole question of immigration policy. Unfortunately the policy was nipped in the bud before it had any real chance to bear fruit. What effect did this change in policy have on the 'ethnic balance'?

There is no doubt that, had the new momentum been allowed to take its natural course, a great increase in the total numbers of immigrants to Canada would have taken place. That a substantial number might have been French-speaking is a statement which also could be well-supported, since the situation in France was just at the point where success was possible after




long years of patient toil on the part of Canadian immigration officers working within the strict limitations imposed upon them by the French authorities.

The relationship between the French government's restrictive attitude and Canadian attempts to secure immigrants from France is treated in considerable detail in Chapter V, which deals with external factors and the influence they exerted on Canadian policy.

Conditions which caused the curtailment of immigration activities in 1957 and 1958 are sometimes interpreted as a reflection of the change in governments in Canada with a resultant change in political emphasis. But in fact, the policy files in the immigration department do not bear out this charge. The policy which changed immigration activities from optimistic aggressive recruitment to pessimistic, cautiously reluctant and restricted promotion was laid down by the D.A.C.I. committee of departmental officials — not by politicians — who recommended to the Minister that he include curtailment of immigration in his submission for Cabinet decision.

The concern first began to be expressed by senior officials of the Department in March and early April of 1957 (which, of course, was prior to any change of government). On April 18, 1957 visa officers were instructed to be more strict in their counselling and selection. At the same time they were instructed that certain categories of immigrants were not to be issued visaes valid after July 31.



The Deputy Minister wrote the Minister in June <u>informing</u>

<u>him of the administrative procedures which had been implemented</u>

to reduce the immigrant flow and suggesting additional restriction
of specific types. The newly-appointed Minister tentatively ap
proved the Deputy Minister®s policy requesting a further review
of the situation.

Those members of the Committee, namely officials of the Immigration Branch itself, who had not themselves been in favor of curtailment but who had been overuled by others on the committee, were not convinced; later in 1958 they tried to re-emphasize a positive program but again were outnumbered by the pessimists from other departments -- particularly Labour -- who maintained their stand on the necessity for curtailment.

The Department of Labour continued to disagree with Immigration officials throughout 1959. Meanwhile, just as expected, the restrictions imposed had affected the flow of the high-quality unsponsored migrants while the low-quality sponsored ones continued to come in large numbers. Roughly speaking, immigration regulations permit admissions to Canada from two basic streams of migrants: (1) unsponsored migrants selected on the basis of their skills, business or entrepreneurial potential or available

^{1.} Note: The Ottawa Journal's editorial of August 9, 1957 stated: Bills of more than \$10,000 a day for care of unemployment immigrants were a factor in making the Conservative government confirm immigration checks decided on by the Liberals.



professional contributions; (2) sponsored <u>unselected migrants</u> who come as a result of the sponsorship of a relative -- no special training, skill or education is required. Some countries receive more consideration than others. (Asians, particularly, are in the less privileged group.) The Department of Immigration, wishing to place the emphasis on the well-qualified unsponsored, recommended that the sponsored movement be curtailed by deleting from the 'sponsored admissibility classes' the non-dependent relatives, i.e. brothers, sisters, married sons and daughters. The Minister, the Hon. Mrs. Fairclough obtained Cabinet approval of these recommendations in February 1959 and an order-in-council was passed to that effect.

Departmental files clearly confirm the intimation which one finds in Hansard that the decision to curtail immigration had been taken long before the new government came into office but the election had delayed its implemention. The economic indices, particularly the unemployment rate, had indicated that the 'absorptive capacity' of the Canadian economy necessitated the curtailment of immigration.

The real criticism about curtailment came in April 1959 after the Order-in-Council of March 19 was enacted, restricting categories of sponsorship. This action had long been recommended by the Departmental officials and the files indicate that the previous government was on the verge of passing something similar



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just prior to their defeat at the polls. Nevertheless, the former Minister (who well knew the background and the necessity for the order) found himself now in the delightful position of a member of the opposition and could 'roast' the government with great glee:


We are told by the Department of Citizenship and Immigration, or by some so-called spokesman for that department, that the reason they made this unnecessary, cruel and inhuman order was to give preference to skilled workers. Of course, that is the most unadulterated camouflage; there is not the slightest intention on the part of the government of doing anything about that at all. This order was just a restriction and it was aimed at one community in this country, it was aimed at those people of Italian origin... The reason it was done, sir, was that when the government realized that more people of Italian origin than people from the United Kingdom came in last year, they got in a panic. They were afraid of many of their political supporters, and they felt they had to do something about it. Then they did this stupid, cruel, silly and inhuman thing."

The government argued that they had been forced to take this step because of the backlog of "sponsored" applications which were making it virtually impossible in some areas for skilled open-placement immigrants to have their cases attended to.

They denied that any other kind of discrimination was involved.

In the end, because of the storm of protest and adverse public opinion reflected by the parliamentary debates, the political repercussions were so intense that pressures to reinstate were irresistable (despite the advisability of the deletion), and the government was forced to rescind the legislation.

^{1.} Mr. Pickersgill, House of Commons Debates (revised), April 15, 1959 p. 2711.



When the attempt by order-in-council failed to restrict entry of sponsored relatives especially from Italy, it is noteworthy that, as is often the case in Government, another method of achieving the same result was tried. The minutes of the *Management Committee* (advisory body to Director of Immigration) for January 4 and 5, 1960 reveal some interesting statements. In the discussion concerned with processing the backlog in Italy, it was decided to provide for the admission of cases of exceptional merit who were not sponsored by close relatives. The situation was that, owing to the huge pile of 'sponsored' categories to be dealt with, "good unsponsored cases were unable to get attention" -- and it was necessary to set up a system of priorities "to do administratively what could not be done by order-in-council last spring". The Committee minutes went on to state that "because it is quite improper to exclude all unsponsored applications from consideration, cases of special merit will be given priority immediately ahead of brothers. sisters, married sons and daughters and so on, i.e. they will be able to come to Canada without undue delay" -- despite the regulations.


In other words, the Department's policy here was clearly contrary to what the political climate found expedient. Immigration officials justified their action on the grounds that Canada's interests were being better served by a policy based on their judgement than on one set by her politicians—hardly



a democratic state of affairs, regardless of how 'right' it might seem to immigration officers. Actually, "administrative control" was not a new practice in the department. There are innumerable ways of controlling the flow of immigrants. The obvious ones whereby a given country is not serviced because there are no immigration offices available or, where there is an office, it is insufficiently staffed, are well-known in immigration circles. An example of this is noted in a memo from the Minister November 6, 1957:

At the present the increasing volume of sponsored migration from Greece and Italy, which has forced the almost complete curtailment of unsponsored immigration from these countries, has been controlled administratively by limiting the processing staff. The backlog of Italian sponsored cases at the end of September, 1957 was 52,004 (persons), an increase of over 20,000 from the previous year...

The numbers of applications for 'sponsored' immigrants were indeed enormous, and this had prompted departmental officials to recommend a 'cut-back' in the first instance, followed by the legislative amendments in the Regulations. The failure to make the order-in-council 'stick' was due to the fact that politically any measure to restrict the entry of relatives causes an emotional reaction from those groups most desirous of bringing in members of their family. Since this category happens also to include the very ones who lack skill and education generally, this means that the government has to choose between two alternatives. They can, on the one hand, satisfy the strong pressures for family re-unification, despite the



lack of economic, educational or skill factors involved or on the other hand, meet the demand for skilled labour while concurrently restricting immigration of potential additions to the unemployables.

Sponsored immigration had begun after World War II as a seemingly practical course of action, at a time when Canada had virtually no immigration machinery. It was cheap, requiring no promotion and little selection staff. In 1950, when the Cabinet approved the admission of sponsored relations of almost any degree, they did not foresee the extent to which the policy would develop. It was not long before officials were attempting some form of control. In 1951 and 1952 they met with strong objections. The "chain reaction" which results from the selection of one open placement worker who, upon landing in Canada, then applied to sponsor another, who in turn sponsors his brother, etc. is illustrated in Appendix B and is referred to as the *seed effect*. In June 1958 the backlog of applications in one office alone was 60,000 -- some of the cases were two years old and 90% of them concerned the *sponsored* category.


The situation became extremely critical in 1959 when, in spite of the numbers arriving, the backlog of applications sky-rocketed at the very time when economic conditions in Canada caused large numbers to be unemployed, and caused labour unions to very strongly criticize immigration generally and the



admission of unskilled and uneducated in particular. Therefore, in response to demands for urgent controls, the Minister of Immigration brought in the restrictions referred to earlier, but was forced to rescind them because of angry protests from opposition members in Parliament, from the press and from the various ethnic groups -- particularly the Italians. The protests were really political in nature but of the type governments can rarely resist.

Since that time various attempts have been made to solve the problem inherent in "sponsorship immigration" but details are too numerous to discuss here and not too relevant to the subject at hand. It is interesting to note that the Canadian law with regard to sponsorship regulations is far more generous than that of most other countries, with the exception of Australia and New Zealand — the latter two, however, exclude virtually all non-Europeans. Although Australia has no hesitation in using her "sponsorship" policy as a "control tool" she seldom suffers political repercussions because ethnic pressure groups have not yet made as much political impact there as in Canada.

^{1.} The oft-mentioned 'White Paper', soon to be tabled in Parliament, occasioned a full review of the whole controversial matter and is expected to recommend for Parliamentary discussion considerable modification of the regulations.



That Canada has been unable to effect any real control is indicated by the fact that since 1958 the sponsored proportion in the Italian movement, for example, has ranged from 92% to 99% each year and from 1955 to 1964 this averaged 19,352 sponsored immigrants per annum. While it is true that there are many objections to increasing the flow of the unskilled 'sponsored' immigrants, (it comprises approximately 55% of the yearly over-all total), the demand for skilled persons has led to a continually expanding search for the second category or 'unsponsored selected' migrant. Recent economic surveys have made it very plain that a shortage of properly trained people exists in Canada. For example, the reports of the Economic Council of Canada stress the need for an emphasis on skills and education, not only where immigration admissions are concerned, but for the training and re-training of Canadian-born as well.

In order to maintain, much less expand, the present economic rate of growth, the experts argue that Canada needs many more trained people. That most officials of the Department itself were convinced of the need for immigration (if only the government would announce a positive policy and provide staff and finances to implement it) may be deduced quite readily from departmental files. During recent years they have consistently advocated increased immigration.




On February 15, 1960 Immigration Minister Fairclough submitted a very important memorandum to the Cabinet outlining the Immigration Branch's arguments for a long-range dynamic policy designed to result in an annual flow of immigrants equal to 1% of Canada's population. While the Cabinet did not approve the submission in all aspects, the Minister was given the authority to decide the actual program without annual reference to Cabinet, as previous policy had required.

However, in 1960 the criticism by labour unions and others raised such a storm in the press and the House of Commons that the Immigration Department (with a newly-appointed Deputy Minister) was forced to continue a severely curtailed program. A new set of very restrictive instructions was issued to all overseas offices:

We do not wish to make an all-out effort to attract a large number of immigrants to Canada next year...officers will lay emphasis on quality not quantity. Similarly, with publicity abroad we wish to change from promotional to informational programs and thus keep Canada in the minds of the people while avoiding a recruiting type of publicity.

This was the policy for both 1961 and 1962; the records reflected the restrictions, showing the lowest immigration in 12 years -- hardly enough to equal the numbers who emigrated for the same period.




Morale in the Department was at a very low ebb and a number of the experienced staff left the service. Those in the Immigration Branch who disagreed with a policy of timidity and vacillation consistently argued for a dynamic and stable immigration policy which would enable Canada to obtain the immigrants necessary to maintain and increase the rate of growth of the economy. They argued that the situation had changed from the point where Canada could sit back passively. Immigrants were needed in this country but if the *turning-on-and-off of the immigration tap* continued, reflecting an image of economic boom and bust, then those who might be contemplating coming to Canada would simply migrate to a more favourable economic climate. The Department considered that:

Immigration policy should aim at an average flow equal to one per cent of the Canadian population with annual movements of from .75 to 1.25 per cent of the population, this would amount to an average annual immigration flow of 175,000 persons.

This view of what immigration policy should be found little receptivity in Cabinet until late 1962 and early 1963. Meanwhile, in January 1962, the Minister had been able to introduce into the House of Commons her new and major revision of the Regulations (discussed earlier in Chapter II).

These became effective February 1, 1962 and led to renewed hope on the part of departmental officials that immigration policy might once again become positive. The new regulations



established the principle of non-discrimination of race, creed or color for the first time in Canadian Immigration law. People anywhere in the world now had an opportunity to immigrate into Canada, provided they were qualified in terms of training and skills.

During the next year or so, the Conservative government was criticized for having an immigration policy which discriminated in favour of education and skills (whereas for many years previous the government's policy had been criticized for being the reverse), for, once the regulations were changed in 1962, criticism on the basis of a colour 'bar' was no longer valid. With skill as the criterion for entry, the policy certainly was much more easily defended.

That the changes were fundamental was undeniable, even though the Act was not amended. Mr. Pickersgill argued,

The greatest change in immigration policy since Mackenzie King announced the resumption of immigration in 1947 has gone into effect without approval or even debate in parliament. The essence of it is to give immigration officials greater responsibility and more individual discretion than they have ever had before...

The reason why such a fundamental change of policy could be made without parliament's approval is that the real control over immigration has always been at the cabinet's discretion. The Immigration Act in practice leaves the government free to do almost anything it wants.

^{1.} Mr. Pickersgill, House of Commons Debates (revised), February 27, 1962, p. 1332



Of course, the Hon. Ellen Fairclough pointed out that the Liberals had revised the whole Act itself in 1952 without permitting real opportunity for debate and yet they were now criticizing the Conservative action of amending the Regulations.

The opposition argued that, though the new regulations were high-sounding, they were really no more than a smoke screen to conceal the substitution of one form of discrimination for another, because only the 'skilled' were allowed entry and others had no change of admission -- strange criticism after all the years the government had been attacked for not bringing in 'high-quality' immigrants'

The new Minister (Mr. Bell) was able to tell the House the following November that:

...the new regulations which my distinguished predecessor sponsored became effective as of February 1 and are working very well, and I think are not in need of any amendment...for the first statistical period that is available there was an increase of 50 per cent in the number of applications.1

While no definite policy had actually been announced, other indications were evident that a movement to accelerate was underway. The leader of the opposition (Mr. Pearson) asked the Minister whether the promise -- reported in a speech given by him in Toronto the previous weekend -- to step up immigration to an annual figure of 1% of the population (or 190,000 per year),

^{1.} Hon. R. A. Bell, House of Commons Debates (revised), November 19, 1962, p. 1763



represented government policy. The Minister replied, "I was dealing with what I believe to be a tolerable target or objective for the absorptive capacity of the Canadian economy over a period of years..."1

In 1963 the Department recommended an aggressive migration policy emphasizing the need for a promotional campaign and active recruitment, a policy followed by countries such as Australia.

But for a promotional or recruitment drive to achieve any degree of success, immigration would need to receive a higher priority, in the government's financial provisions, than it had ever had in the past. As a result of the 'restrictive' freeze, staff establishments were exceedingly low and overseas offices were in particularly drastic need of additional personnel.

To impress the overseas staff that conditions were changing, the Immigration Minister (Hon. R. A. Bell) on January 15, 1963 ordered instructions sent to all overseas officers that "we are back in the immigration business."

Several assumptions have been involved when the Immigration Branch has argued, in the past, for an expanded program of immigration. They still continue to underlie the thinking of the department. The first is that Canada needs, and can absorb,

^{1.} Ibid.




more immigrants; second, that there exists a supply of suitable persons who are interested in migrating to Canada and third, that Canada prefers to receive immigrants from traditional sources.

The first assumption is the considered opinion held by responsible officials of the Department in the field as well as by experts in the appropriate government services interested in Canada®s economic welfare. They are in a position to judge both the rate of economic growth and the number of new people who can be absorbed.

The second assumption is not as easily justified, since the suitably qualified are in increasingly short supply in many countries throughout the world -- some, such as Australia, are willing and able to spend large sums in promotion and recruitment, whereas Canada®s effort is not at all comparable.

The third and final assumption has long been the belief of both politicians and immigration officials. They claim that the Canadian public wishes to maintain its traditional ethnic balance -- the difficulty comes when one asks the definition of *traditional sources *. As outlined elsewhere, the concept of *ethnic balance* has, in the minds of Department officials, meant *white vs. coloured*. Were this not so, the almost limitless supply of Asian and West Indian migrants would have



been used to fill the demand for immigrants, since they can be obtained with a minimum expenditure of effort, time or money. As one official (who refused to allow his name to be revealed) told this writer, "We spend a fortune chasing after skilled immigrants from Northern Europe (or so-called traditional) sources when we could get an unlimited supply for virtually nothing in Japan and Hong Kong, to say nothing of the West Indies and India." But all of these are countries whose people have different skin colour. Another source puts it this way:

We are bound by the provisions of the Immigration Regulations (since 1962) to <u>service</u> applications anywhere in the world but there is nothing to prevent us from concentrating our promotion of immigration from our traditional sources.

The costs and difficulties of recruiting immigrants in the so-called "traditional" countries are considerable. Until recently only the United Kingdom, Ireland and the United States allowed the Department to advertise directly. Countries such as France, Belgium and the Netherlands now permit some indirect advertising. Progress has been made in this respect in recent months and officers have had slightly increased budgets with which to operate their promotional campaigns although broad guiding principles are set out for them by Ottawa. Most countries are opposed to any promotional activities and, because of this restrictive attitude, immigration officers are obliged to project an image of Canada in the best way they know, without arousing the suspicions or ire of the host country. Chapter V, Part A, covers in detail the influence of such external factors on federal policy.



Actually, the above-noted assumptions continued to influence government policy when the Hon. Guy Favreau became Minister (after the Liberals regained power in 1963). No major changes were made in policy although, judging from the criticisms which the party had made when in opposition, some might justifiably have been expected.

A cabinet shuffle later replaced Mr. Favreau with Mr. Tremblay but again no noticeable changes in policy occurred, despite the Minister's announcement, in the course of the Throne Speech debate early in 1964, that the government intended to embark on a vigorous new policy. Then, later, he elaborated on the government's intention of soliciting immigrants instead of merely providing the facilities for those who decided to come and stated that "...We are now revising our whole immigration policy precisely to be better able to determine the possibilities, in men, which the various countries of the world offer us in order to attain our objectives." Later in the debate he repeated his stand, "...We have reached the point where the needs of the country as regards to immigration are so acute that our immigration policy must be revised and made more positive."2 He then went on to state that facilities abroad must be improved in terms of both staff and offices, in order to effect the new policy.

Hon. René Tremblay, House of Commons Debates (revised), March 16, 1964, p. 957
 Ibid., March 25, 1964, p. 1468




On July 31, 1964 -- during debates on Interim Supply -the opposition charged the Citizenship and Immigration Department
with gross lack of action and argued that Canada needed immigrants
and needed to up-date her facilities overseas in order to keep
well-qualified people and raise the state of morale generally.
Literature, publicity and advertising generally came under attack
as not adequate to meet the needs of encouraging immigrants in
competition with Australia and other countries.

Some members of the House considered that, while the Immigration Minister was not very active with respect to immigration generally, he was going too far in trying to get specific kinds of immigrants. The question of Algerians had been raised many times in the House, but it was brought in with particular regularity during the 1964-65 debates.

Members were critical of the arrangements purported to have been made for some former Algerian farmers to immigrate to Canada. The department said that all of the repatriates would have to comply with the provisions of the Immigration Act but then the Government had announced that some officials from France had come over to "make arrangements" for certain groups of Algerian farmers. A newspaper article was quoted:

... Canada and France have reached agreement on the conditions under which French farmers repatriated to France from former French territories in North Africa may enter Canada as immigrants...



and questions concerning it were directed at the government.


One member demanded:

to reach agreement on the conditions? It is my understanding that it was very difficult for anyone to immigrate to this country from France, because of special conditions set up by the French government which prevented citizens leaving France and going to any other country. If this is the case, I would like to know why the government of France is ready to make an agreement with the government of Canada to allow these repatriates to enter this country. I wish to know, does this new agreement make it possible for any farmer in France, whether he be repatriate or a native of that country to immigrate to Canada?

Then referring to special services offered, he asked, "...Does it mean that these services are not at the disposal of all immigrants to this country and that these are special provisions made for these particular immigrants? What is the change of policy in this respect?" Then he went on,

Were these French officials in Canada at the invitation of the French government? Was special provision made to invite them to come to this country? Did they tour this country from coast to coast at the invitation of the Canadian government to see where these people might be repatriated in Canada; or is this a a courtesy that is accorded to all nations, namely to send delegations to this country and tour it from coast to coast to see where immigrants might best be settled? ... are they going to be treated differently from any other immigrants?...!

^{1.} Mr. Danforth, House of Commons Debates (revised), July 31 1964, p. 6258




128.

The Parliamentary Assistant to the Minister replied on behalf of the Minister, stating that no special concessions had been made. In fact, an exchange of Notes had set up arrangements for the re-establishment on Canadian farms of farmers from former French North African colonies. A trained agriculturalist had been sent from Canada to France to help in the selection, in accordance with the terms of the exchange of Notes. The federal government, it would appear, was taking rather unusual steps to bring in French-speaking immigrants.

A few months later in the same year it was possible to see how the public statements of the government were beginning to stress 'skill' as the important factor in immigration, just as the Conservatives had tried to do, without too much success, a year or two previously. Mr. Tremblay made a long statement to the House on August 14, 1964 in which he declared the first principle of the government's immigration policy was "to bring to Canada the well-skilled on a substantial scale" and the second principle was "to assist in the re-union of families and to aid refugees."

He then went on to announce his major re-organization of the department, elaborating on an earlier comment he had made

^{1.} A similar announcement appears to come automatically from every new Minister who takes over duties in the Department, although none ever seem to stay long enough to effect the changes. Consequently, the Department has for the last several years been in a continual state of re-organization (or, as some officials themselves say, disorganization).



in the House on the subject. (The Minister had argued that administrative reform was the first thing to be done)
"...When we came into power there were 206 vacancies in the immigration branch. How do you expect such a service to be efficient, when the higher officials were removed for austerity reasons and were never replaced."

Regardless of whether the administration of the Department was or was not efficient, the policy was proclaimed to be one of seeking out skilled immigrants. In this connection, the Minister told the House in September 1964 that his Department was paying special attention to Italian immigrants and might possibly open a second office -- this time in the more industrialized northern section, which would yield more skilled immigrants than would the southern agricultural areas. (At the same time, a Cabinet Committee was considering a Departmental recommendation to control the movement of certain categories of Italians, Greeks and Portuguese!)

However, some critics maintained that this interest in the northern Italians stemmed from the fact that French Canadians considered them to be more akin to themselves than other immigrants (even the southern Italians). Again, it was intimated that pressures to bring in French-speaking immigrants, or those alleged to be assimilable to the French, were so pronounced that the Government was giving priority to that aspect over all others.

^{1.} Hon. René Tremblay, House of Commons Debates (revised), November 3, 1964, p. 9701.



That skilled immigrants were in short supply in Canada was, nonetheless, a fact. Most provincial governments were beginning to be concerned. Naturally, the most industrialized province could be expected to feel the demand, and it was no surprise that Ontario should decide to take action. This province, as explained in detail in Chapter IV, has always had a keen interest in immigration. The Minister (Mr. Randall) of Economics and Development for Ontario was reported to have taken a trip to Japan and Hong Kong in October 1964 in search of highly-trained workers, and was quoted as saying that Ontario intended to bring in 15,000 from these countries. Incidentally, when queried in the House of Commons about this, the Prime Minister remarked that if this was so he was confident Mr. Randal would "take them (the proposals) up with the proper federal authorities."

If one were to read the speeches of the Minister (Hon. J. Nicholson) during 1965, he would conclude that the policy of the Department was subjected to a careful revision, by consultation, between federal-provincial officials, representatives of business, labour and all others interested in immigration policy.

How much of this actually occurred in fact is another matter. There is no doubt that there was a great deal of

^{1.} Rt. Hon. L.B. Pearson, House of Commons Debates, (revised), November 3, 1964 p. 9701



talk about revision and re-organization etc., but basically there was no fundamental change in the thinking of the departmental officials. They had for years been advocating an emphasis on *skills* and a reduction of the sponsorship category of immigrant who was not in possession of some trade or special skill, etc. This was the very policy that the Conservative government had tried and found so politically unpalatable -- the very one, too, which the Liberals had criticized so strongly and yet now found themselves advocating and defending.


The government did not introduce any amendments to the 'perennially denounced' Immigration Act. This, of course, would have necessitated a full-scale debate in Parliament of a subject so politically sensitive as to cause a considerable number of cracks not only in the Liberal party, but in each of the other parties as well insofar as each M.P. is dependent for his seat on his constituents' pleasure. Many constituencies are dominated by large groups of particular ethnic origins whose pressure tactics have long been familiar to people in politics.

^{1.} Space does not allow a detailed account of the many speeches and pronouncements made to various groups across Canada. The Minister referred, on innumerable public occasions, to the needs for new legislation and he outlined the many matters which were being incorporated in the promised and much talked-of 'White Paper' such as (a) control over the entry of criminal and other undesirable elements (b) medical prohibitions re epilepsy, insanity etc. (c) areas of miniserial and departmental discretion and (d) appeals, enquiries and deportation regulations. Both inside and outside the House he expressed the need for skilled immigrants.



What should the government do? While the country waits for a clearly defined policy of more than passing duration, the Department and the Government far too often have skirted the basic issues and talked in platitudes, hoping that nothing will happen to cause an eruption of sufficient dimension to necessitate a strong stand such as would alienate any substantial segment of voting public.

From time to time a special case comes up and causes a two-or-three-day flareup -- charges and counter-charges are made but usually the Immigration Branch bears the brunt of the criticism. It certainly ends up as the scapegoat more often than not. Such debates as do occur in Parliament on the general principles of immigration contain annually the same type of criticism and repeat the same worn-out arguments that have appeared ad nauseum, over several decades. In 1965, as formerly, one finds in Hansard the arguments of French Canadians against immigration and charges of deliberate anglicization to lower the French proportion. Countering these are claims of too many admissions into Canada of Roman Catholic Italians and also statements by French and English-speaking alike to the effect that there has not been enough interest on the part of either the federal government or the provincial governments (particularly Quebec) in this question of immigration policy.



Likewise discrimination again figured in the debates of 1965. It became the subject of a private member's bill (No. C-69) to amend the Immigration Act. The Bill was designed to delete section 61 (g) which the member argued gave authorization to the governor-in-council to keep people out on the ground of their ethnic groupings and the geographical areas from which they come. The Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister denied the contention and said: "...The regulations introduced in recent years (referring to the major change in 1962) removed every possible suggestion that admissibility to Canada was governed, directly or indirectly, by the ethnic origin of intending settlers..."²

Other members argued, nevertheless, at various times throughout the debates of that year that government policy and administrative practices were such as to bring about discrimination. When facilities are not provided to process applications, for example, it hardly matters that the 'law' approves such admissions.

When the Minister was questioned with regard to new facilities or increased staff in certain offices abroad so that

^{1.} Mr. A. Brewin (Greenwood) moved the second reading March 12, 1965 (see page 12,318 unrevised Hansard) but the bill never came to a vote. He re-introduced it during the 1966 session as Bill No. C-25 (January 24) with likelihood of a similar fate.

^{2.} Mr. Badanai, House of Commons Debates (unrevised), March 12, 1965 p. 12,323



the backlog of requests might be handled, he replied that "a full-scale discussion" was underway at the moment.

It was interesting to note that while the Liberals had ridiculed the Conservatives for using unemployment as the reason for not having an active immigration policy, the Minister in the same speech could state:


...when we were faced with the serious unemployment situation that existed in Canada up until a relatively short time ago, the extent to which we should step up our immigration services was questionable, especially in those countries from which we were getting immigrants having no special skills or trade...²

The implication in the Minister's words was also that immigration on the basis of skills was a better policy than one of unskilled persons. Presumably, only the 'White Paper' (when it is tabled) will determine whether or not official policy is to be just that.

Incidentally on March 12, 1965, the Minister announced, in Parliament, that this 'White Paper' would be brought in before spring was out; then again on May 7 he stated it would be ready in three months' time. Approximately a year later, yet another Minister (Hon. Jean Marchand) is still promising it!

One member pointed out that each new Minister in a row has declared that his top priority is a new amended act, and he queried:

^{1.} Hon. J. Nicholson, House of Commons Debates (revised)
May 4, 1965 pp. 893-4
2. Ibid.




Can the government house leader give us an assurance, a commitment, that we will not have to say in the next session: "Blessed are those who run around in circles because they shall be known as big wheels"? Are we having early next session a revised citizenship and immigration act?

In reply, it was intimated that the Throne Speech might provide this information. The member commented wryly, "This measure has been mentioned in throne speech after throne speech, but we have yet to see a new Act..." and then went on to say that he hoped the government would soon fulfil its promise.

Early in the year it became noticeable that the Department, too, was emphasizing the need for skilled immigrants. In May the Deputy Minister travelled to Western Europe to launch a drive for skilled immigrants and to impress upon overseas offices Canada's need for skilled manpower. Theoretically, the needs were based on the result of a study of all Canadian provinces but in fact only British Columbia, Saskatchewan, New Brunswick and Ontario participated.

Actually there are two schools of thought on this question of bringing in skilled immigrants to "stop up the gap in the industrial economy." If it is just a case of finding qualified immigrants to meet identifiable labour shortages in Canada then some of the senior officials in the Department feel that such a policy is wrong.

^{1.} Mr. H. Winch, House of Commons Debates (unrevised), April 1, 1965, p. 13075.



For example, on June 11, 1965 Mr. Nicholson made a speech in Vancouver to the leaders of industry, unions and university saying, among other things, that his department was out to obtain as many skilled immigrants as possible to fill the needs of industry (though he did concede other bases for immigration policy) "... Immigration policy has, of course, other responsibilities than simply maintaining a balance between manpower and industrial requirements. But I am sure you will agree that this should be a major consideration in our immigration planning..."

That this was not the view of the Director of Policy and Planning in the Department of Immigration is evidenced by a memo to the Assistant Deputy Minister on the files for June 10, 1965:

- 1. I have just seen the text of the speech the minister plans to give in Vancouver and I am shocked to note what appears to be a major reversal of the basic immigration policy which this and previous governments of Canada have followed since World War II.
- 2. Our basic policy has been to foster the growth and development of Canada through immigration. Our programs have been based upon the firm belief that immigrants create jobs and stimulate the economy, and these beliefs have been validated by the success of the post-war immigration program. We believe in selected immigration and high quality immigration, in the sense that immigration must be related to the capacity of the immigrants to become established in Canada. We do not believe that immigration should be related solely to identifiable labour shortages in Canada.



- Vancouver reflects a policy in which the primary objective of immigration would be to fill specific job vacancies in Canada. This is a narrow, selfish policy which if carried to its logical conclusion would be the death knell of a positive immigration program in Canada.
- 4. If we relate immigration to the identifiable job vacancies, what happens when we no longer are enjoying boom conditions in Canada and we can no longer demonstrate specific labour shortages. Our experience has been that we can still settle desirable immigrants and that these immigrants are good for Canada, good for the economy, and create jobs. However, if we follow the policy outlined in this speech we shall find that when the boom is no longer with us the Provinces and the Department of Labour, who are so happy about immigration becoming a gap-filling process, will claim that as the gaps are gone, immigration should be cut off.
- 5. Immigration cannot become a narrow process of matching people to job vacancies in Canada. Immigration is an act of faith in the future of this country and must be carried out as a great and visionary project of national development. Further, a country like Canada cannot base an immigration program solely on selfish factors. We must not admit only those whom we desperately need, but should also permit the continued immigration of people who need us and who are able to settle here without undue hardship or dislocation to Canada or to themselves.

Despite this, the race for "filling the shortage of skilled labour" by immigration seemed to be underway. On July 29 the minister was quoted by an Ottawa newspaper as saying that he was:

rent European tour, aimed at boosting the country's immigration campaign to relieve a shortage of skilled labour. He said discussions in Greece and Italy -- Canada's largest supplier of immigrants -- have gone well...

^{1.} Ottawa Journal -- July 29, 1965, p. 10




The next day the Globe and Mail quoted the Minister as saying his three-week European tour had been 'very successful' and the newspaper went on to say:

...Before leaving Ottawa July 9 Mr. Nicholson said his department is stepping up efforts to find skilled immigrants by looking to the United States, Japan and the Phillipines as possible sources, in addition to the traditional European sources.
...Vacancies for skilled workers in Ontario and British Columbia alone are expected to total 150,000 by the end of the year...

The Minister was reported as being pleased at the reception he had received in all countries and that French authorities had been "cooperative and friendly."

While the government's policy as stated in Parliament was to encourage the French-speaking immigrants, we note that the Minister in speaking to representatives of the ethnic press said that Canadians had too often "tried to resolve our problems in the context of a purely bicultural solution"... and tend to "forget that, more and more, the nation that we call Canada is drawing its strength and its vitality from not one or two sources but from a vast and scattered assortment of nations, each with its individual culture and heritage, and each of which has blended and mingled to form Canada as we find it today"...²

^{1.} Globe and Mail -- July 30, 1965, p. 82
2. quoted from a mimeographed copy for release September 25, 1965 of an address by the Hon. J. R. Nicholson at a luncheon of the Ethnic Press in Toronto.



141.

One wonders about the government's professed commitment to the concept of 'ethnic balance' when one considers the Minister's statement that:

this country must come primarily from Great Britain and, when it can be encouraged, from France. Today we must be keenly aware that the future of Canada lies in the encouragement of migration to our shores of fine, upstanding people from all the lands on the face of this earth, who are prepared to bring their knowledge, their skills, their knowledge of the arts, their industry and their savings to help build the new Canada.

In another speech the same day in Toronto, the Minister spoke to a group of Chinese Canadians and extolled the virtues of the Liberal government's policy which had shown a 'new attitude' to Chinese immigrants. He said:

...more new Chinese immigrants have come to this country since the Pearson Government took office in 1963 than the entire Chinese population of Toronto at the time of the 1961 census.

Certainly as referred to earlier, there was a great deal of talk in 1965 about immigration and the need for skilled immigrants. Frequent reference was made to the fact that "immigration today is a competitive business" and that Canadian legislation was under review.

One newspaper editorial sarcastically commented that "a government that has got no further than a review after

^{1.} Mimeographed copy address by Hon. J. R. Nicholson before the Chinese Community Centre of Ontario at Toronto, September 25, 1965.




 $2\frac{1}{2}$ years in office is not being impressively competitive in obtaining immigrants.

In December a major 'Cabinet' shuffle brought yet another new Minister to this so-called 'hot-seat' of the government. A press interview of January 4, 1966 indicated that the review was still underway on the Immigration Act and that a policy of selective immigration would continue. At the same time the Minister announced that 2,500,000 immigrants had arrived in Canada since 1945.

In the light of what has been written so far in this particular chapter one could infer that Canada's policy is "selective immigration with an unselected movement incapable of control under present legislation." But how 'selective' can any policy be if the numbers of unselected equal or surpass those of the selected. The temptation to go outside the legislation and control by administration is constantly before the officials and on many occasions in the past they have succumbed, in the belief that it was in the best interests of the country to do so. That "a thorough review of the Immigration Act is long-overdue," has been said so often as to have become trite. As already indicated, the present government promised (as had the previous government in 1962) a 'White Paper' on immigration policy, immigration administration and immigration procedures in December 1964; fifteen months later it is still

^{1.} Ottawa <u>Journal</u> editorial "Slow on Immigration" September 29, 1965.



being anticipated. In the short space of the last forty months the Department has had no less than six ministers, four deputy ministers (one "acting" for a very long period) and innumerable changes in senior officials both in Canada and overseas. How can there by any stability of policy? The handicaps under which the departmental officials are operating are legion.

In addition, practically every aspect of immigration legislation has come under strong criticism; judicial inquiries have been ordered into the matter of certain deportations, the question of the appeal board and the discretionary powers of the minister, to mention only a few of the controversies surrounding the work of the Department.

However, a new emphasis is beginning to be discernible, and that is the desire of an increasing number to criticize the government for its inattention to the problems of integration of the immigrants. Insufficient Government concern with respect to the social implications of so-called "ethnic islands" formed in Canadian cities, e.g., Italians in Toronto, Montreal and so on, plus the urgent educational needs of large numbers of children (and adults) who are handicapped because of a lack of understanding in either English or French, pose even greater future problems for all levels of government.

^{1.} Note: Joseph Sedgwick, Q.C. was retained as counsel to inquire into certain allegations made (in May 25 and June 18, 1964 Hansards) and to report to the Minister of Citizenship and Immigration and Minister of Justice. The terms of reference were informal only. It was not an inquiry under the Inquiries Act (see Hansard (unrevised) June 22, 1964 - p. 4560.)



Added to all this, charges have been made that senior officials have consistently thwarted any minister who really tries to give direction to the department. As the officials are indeed the ones who carry out the day-to-day operations (even though the ultimate responsibility is the Minister's) they can very effectively control policy. But do they? It seems impossible to get at the truth.

The difficulty in trying to establish just exactly what official policy is at any given moment is that politicians have the deplorable habit of saying one thing in the House of Commons and another in public -- even Cabinet Members do not always agree. This is, in itself, bad enough but could be over come if it were possible to ascertain conclusively what is the actual practice at any precise stage. One might expect this would be easy enough to establish, but Immigration does not lend itself to such a simple solution. Thorough research of every aspect of the day-to-day operations, at each post abroad, as well as extensive knowledge of the entire Headquarters and Canadian field practices would first be necessary. This alone would take more time and money than most researchers are allowed but it would have to be augmented by a study of the political machinations, intrigues and back room deals which, according to some critics, defy description. A more politically sensitive subject is hard to find.




Because of the particular manner in which the Immigration Act allows regulations to be made and because of the range and complexity of the orders and instructions issued for the day-to-day operations, it is hard to determine the actual practices of the Department. There is so little clarity, stability or uniformity in the Department's rules and regulations that one officer may easily interpret them quite differently from the next. An instance of this is that an immigrant may be refused admission one day by one officer and accepted the next by another.

Added to all of this is the political factor which, far more often than not, has been such that when the pressure is exerted, a decision can be reversed in just the brief span of time it takes the Minister or a senior official to pick up the phone and issue new instructions.

The administration of this "unholy mess of confusing rules" leaves the department open to inefficiency at best, and to downright criminal malpractice at worst.

So long as immigration is being dealt with by regulation rather than by statutory legislation, the situation will remain subject to criticism and in urgent need of clarification. The host of immigration policy matters which remain unanswered make it imperative that the federal government declare its intentions in the near future.



Officials of the Department can hardly be blamed for the delay in the presentation of a 'White Paper' or a revision of the Act. For, as a member of the opposition (also a former Minister of Immigration) put it:

their files are bulging so full of material that they could produce a white paper in a fortnight. But no minister, and certainly not the Cabinet, has taken the time to decide on policy: and so our immigration policy merely drifts.

This same member urged the government to adopt a positive approach and a policy based on an average flow equal to one per cent of the Canadian population per annum. It was essential, he claimed:

...to set long-range targets and objectives and to stick with them whatever the temporary domestic economic climate...because "the...*tap on, tap off* approach has been the curse of the Department. ... It...has had a highly deleterious effect upon the morale of the department. Just as plans are prepared and ready, they are scrapped. It is a tribute to the dedication of the staff that wholesale departures of staff have been avoided...

The Minister (Hon. Jean Marchand) was questioned about why the extent of immigration from certain countries was large and from others small; in particular there was question about the lack of immigrants from France. He replied:

^{1.} R. A. Bell, House of Commons Debates (unrevised), March 7, 1966, p. 2308



...we cannot decide alone where we will take our immigrants, because it is necessary that immigrants should want to come and that the countries where they live should also be ready to let them come. Therefore, we will have to submit and accept the situation as it is...

In further questioning about immigration from France and the attitudes of the Quebec government regarding jurisdiction over immigration, the member for Charlevoix² referred to the recent 'act adopted in Quebec' and asked:

Must the provinces get in touch and co-operate with the federal Department of Citizenship and Immigration with regard to this important question of immigration?

The Minister replied:

The province, like the federal government, has jurisdiction in the field of immigration. But Section 95 ...says that in the case where the provincial legislation conflicts with or contradicts the federal legislation, the federal government takes precedence.

Mr. Asselin further queried, "Can the Minister tell me whether the Quebec government got in touch with him about the establishment of an immigration service in Quebec?" The reply from Mr. Marchand, "Quebec did not get in touch with us", together with his comments above on federal-provincial relationship where legislation was concerned, leads us to the next chapter.

March 7, 1966, p. 2327. 2. Mr. Asselin, İbid., p. 2334

^{1.} Hon. Jean Marchand, House of Commons Debates (unrevised)
March 7, 1966, p. 2327.

^{3.} Ibid., p. 2334

^{4.} Hon. Jean Marchand, Ibid., p. 2334

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^{2.} Mr. Asselin, Ibid., p. 2334

^{4.} Men. Jour Marchand, Ibid., p. 2314



